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THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE OF
NORTH CAROLINA: THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
ROBERT E. PHAY*
The eminent domain law of North Carolina is a confusing, often
contradictory, collection of statutes that have been enacted one on
top of another with little, if any, consideration for the impact on the
existing body of the law. The general eminent domain law is scat-
tered through twenty-six chapters of the North Carolina General
Statutes. They authorize over seventy condemnors to condemn pri-
vate property for one or several purposes by proceeding in accord-
ance with one of over eighteen procedures.- Supplementing the
general law, local legislation has authorized additional eminent do-
main powers and procedures. Many larger cities2 and a number of
counties 3 possess special powers that have been granted through this
medium. This local-law authority has added to the already large
nuitber of eminent domain grants and procedures authorized by
the general law and consequently has increased the confusion that
exists in eminent domain law.
Much of this law, some of which predates the Revolutionary War,
* Assistant Professor of Public Law and Government, Institute of Gov-
ernment, University of North Carolina.
'Eminent domain law can be broken down into two areas. One is the
"granting law," which authorizes some seventy condemnors to condemn
property. The other is the "procedural law," which sets out the way and
manner that the grant of authority may be effectuated.
'Municipalities are the most common recipient of eminent domain power
granted by local legislation. The power, and usually a procedure for the use
of that power, is most often granted in the city charter, but it may also be
given in a special act concerned only with eminent domain. Consequently,
a city may have been given different eminent domain authority over a
period of many years, most of which is no longer used and may have been
forgotten. Because new charters often do not repeal prior local acts, many
laws may exist that are obsolete, or the particular need for which they were
intended may have ceased to exist. For one of the more complete and
involved condemnation procedures that has been authorized by local legis-
lation, see N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 1137, § 6.101.
8 See, e.g., N.C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1911, ch. 431, which grants the Guil-
ford Board of County Commissioners the power to create a drainage dis-
trict and to condemn property for its use. The Law sets up a special pro-
cedure quite different from the article 2 procedure that the county might
otherwise use.
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is antiquated and unused; it needs to be updated and obsolete por-
tions repealed. In addition, the general law needs to be recodified
and reorganized into one chapter of the General Statutes. Because
the present law is scattered through so many chapters of the Gen-
eral Statutes, one seeking to determine whether the general law has
conferred condemnation authority for a particular purpose on a
particular body and what procedures are available to it has great
difficulty in locating his answer.4
Another of the difficulties that needs statutory correction is the
confusion and lack of uniformity in the procedural aspect. Part of
this confusion and lack of uniformity is a result of the multiplicity
of procedures for condemning property. The general law provisions
establish over eighteen separate condemnation procedures. Conse-
quently, the case law that has evolved in interpreting the various
procedures has not been uniform and has in many ways contributed
to the confusion in knowing what law applies to which procedure.5
An additional factor in this confusion is that some of these pro-
cedures, such as that authorized for the condemnation for water
mills,' are no longer used, and many of them are used only rarely.
Confusion and lack of uniformity in the procedural law also
result from the general eminent domain procedure of article 2 of
chapter 40 of the North Carolina General Statutes, much of which
' Contrary to reasonable expectations, the index to the General Statutes
does not list all citations to these powers. As a result, many condemnors
are unaware of all the powers and procedures authorized by the general
law for condemnation purposes. In addition to this general law authority,
the condemnor may also have eminent domain power granted by local legis-
lation that is even more difficult to find. Anyone attempting to determine
whether such power has been granted or to locate all the special act author-
ity must check the session laws, session by session, in his search.
Inevitable confusion results when courts must interpret different pro-
cedures. What might be true for one procedure may not be true for another,
but understandably, attorneys, clerks of court, and lower court judges
sometimes think that a pronouncement of the Supreme Court on one pro-
cedure applies to another, and the Supreme Court's decision itself may not
make clear whether a ruling in one condemnation case is to apply only to
that one procedure or to all condemnation procedures.
One result of the uniform federal practice, under FE. R. Civ. P. 7 1(a),
has been the development of an excellent body of federal case law relating
to condemnation procedure. As one practitioner observed, "Guidelines have
been laid down which have taken much of the guessing out of procedural
questions in federal cases." See Ward, Condemnation Proceedings Before
the Clerk of the Superior Court (paper presented to the Forty-third Con-
ference of Superior Court Clerks at Morehead City, N.C., July 1962)
[hereinafter cited as Ward]. A copy is in the library of the Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 73-5 to-13 (1960).
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is antiquated, misleading, or ambiguous. As the North Carolina
Supreme Court said in 1908 in referring to the article 2 procedure,
"The provisions of the statute regarding the mode of procedure and
rules of practice are indefinite and obscure. ' 7 Today, almost sixty
years later, this same procedure, still "indefinite and obscure," con-
tinues in use.
Although space does not permit an examination of all the pro-
cedures authorized, this article will consider some of the reasons
for the large number of them. It will then examine in some detail
the basic condemnation procedure of chapter 40, including some of
the difficulties it creates for the condemnor, the condemnee, and the
courts, some of the problems with the policy it effectuates, and a
few of the alternatives that might be considered if the procedure
were to be altered. This discussion should make clear why this
writer thinks that a complete overhaul of the eminent domain law
needs to be undertaken by the legislature. Such an undertaking
should include a review of the procedures now used; the repeal of
those statutes now obsolete; the clarification of the intent and policy
of those statutes under which the state will then operate; and the
establishment of one uniform procedure, codified with the rest of the
law into one chapter. These changes are sorely needed if order and
clarity are to be brought to the law of eminent domain.
Explaining why the legislature has chosen to enact so many
different types of procedures is not easy. Probably the basic reason
is inherent in the condemnation process itself. Condemnation repre-
sents a conflict between the protection of the owner's property rights
on the one hand and the public's need for administrative convenience
and expediency on the other. Thus the multitude of different pro-
cedures is largely a reflection of dissimilar judgments as to what
is more important-protection of personal property or administra-
tive expediency-in a specific type of condemnation.
An examination of the condemnors authorized to exercise emi-
nent domain illuminates some of the factors that may have influenced
the legislature when it established these procedures. The first such
factor that might have been considered by the General Assembly is
the type of public interest that a particular condemnor may repre-
sent when it seeks to condemn public property. Although each
condemnor-from the municipality to the railroad-represents some
Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N.C. 97, 103, 63 S.E. 180, 183
(1908).
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public interest, the degree of that public interest varies from con-
demnor to condemnor. For example, the railroad, like other quasi-
public condemnors, represents a more limited public interest than
the municipality, a public condemnor. Consequently, the legislature
is likely to place different procedural burdens on the two, weighing
the procedure more in favor of the landowner when the quasi-public
condemnor seeks to condemn than when the public condemnor brings
the action.
Another factor that distinguishes condemnors and thus tends to
produce a multiplicity of procedures is the factor of speed or urgency
with which a condemnation must be made. For example, the special
procedure authorizing the governor to seize property as he deems
necessary when a state of civil emergency exists indicates a legis-
lative judgment that speed is sometimes more important than pro-
viding procedural safeguards for property owners.8 For a metro-
politan sewer district, however, the condemnation is not so im-
mediately necessary, and the sewer district must use the slower pro-
cedure of article 2.9
Still another difference between condemnors that may be re-
flected in the procedure authorized is the purpose for which the
property is sought. To illustrate, the State Highway Commission
is authorized to condemn for highways, a purpose usually thought
of as a necessity. On the other hand, the Department of Conserva-
tion and Development is granted the power to build fisheries or
recreational areas, a purpose most often classified as beneficial but
not necessary. Such differences in purpose have resulted in different
value judgments as to which property is more important for the
condemnor to have without delay, and this has resulted in different
procedures for the two condemnors. Consequently the manner of
proceeding and the allocation of the procedural burdens among the
condemnors and condemnee has often been made on the basis of
the purpose for which the condemnor seeks the property.
Although the reasons just suggested help to explain the multi-
plicity of procedures authorized by both general and local legislation,
they do not fully explain the local-legislation situation. Procedures
and authority stemming from local legislation are primarily the
' See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166-6 (1964), which gives the Governor,
if a state of civil defense emergency has been declared, the power to con-
demn, without resorting to any procedure, property needed to meet that
emergency.' See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-300(10) (1964).
[Vol. 45
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result of a municipality or county seeking to make its procedure
easier than that authorized by the general law."° For example,
Greensboro added a lengthy eminent domain procedure in its 1959
charter revision that exempted the city from the article 2 require-
ment of proving an unsuccessful effort to purchase and also gave
the city "quick take" powers." Besides adding to the plethora of
general law procedures, the local-act procedure creates still another
problem. When a condemnor, usually a city or county, has been
given condemnation power and procedures by both the General
Statutes and special legislation, the two procedures may conflict.
If they do, the charter provision takes precedence over the general
law provision. In Clinton v. Johnson,12 a case in which the right
to condemn for identical purposes was given by both the charter
and the general law, the court held that the power of eminent do-
main granted to a municipality can be exercised only in the manner
provided by the statute conferring it, but when the method pre-
scribed by the municipal charter is inconsistent with or repugnant
to the express terms of the general law, the procedure specified by
the municipal charter takes precedence.
Many other reasons may have been responsible for the multiple
condemnation procedures. Perhaps unfamiliarity with the existing
eminent domain law and a natural reluctance to attempt an overhaul
of the current law are explanations as nearly accurate for the multi-
plicity of procedures as the reasons given above: it is usually easier
to add a new procedure than to adapt a new condemnor to the exist-
ing law. Whatever the reasons, the General Assembly has enacted
over eighteen different procedures in the general law and many
others by local legislation among which the condemnor and the
condemnee resort for a determination of just compensation.
Although our legislature has authorized the use of almost thirty
different condemnation procedures, practically all condemnations
10 Not all public laws have general application. A public statute or
amendment may specify that it applies to only one or several counties. The
codifier has arbitrarily decided that when such is the case, if the statute
and/or amendments to the statute affect nine counties or less, they are
labeled a "local modification" and thereby excluded from the codified law.
Of all the grants of eminent domain found in the General Statutes, only
one provision of the General Statutes did not apply to all similar bodies.
It is N.C. GENI. STAT. § 139-41 (1964), concerning watershed-improvement
programs, which affects only 10 of 100 counties.
"See the Greensboro charter, N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 1137, § 6.101.
174 N.C. 286, 93 S.E. 776 (1917).
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today are brought under the article 2 procedure of chapter 40.Y,
The procedure had its origin in a 1871 law authorizing the forma-
tion of railroad companies.14 One part of that law contained a
condemnation procedure to be used by railroads, and today that rail-
road procedure is the procedure known as article 2.'"
Forty-six different types of condemnors are authorized by the
General Statutes to proceed under article 2. (These condemnors, the
source of their authority, and the purposes for which it is granted
are listed in the table following the conclusion of this article.) The
majority of this number derive their power from article 1 of chapter
40. Some, however, are granted eminent domain power in other
chapters but are'required to use the article 2, chapter 40, procedure.
Although the procedure might be expected to be the same for all
condemnors, regardless of the source of their authority, some varia-
tions exist. The statute granting the authority may exempt its con-
demnor from a limitation imposed on others, or it may add an addi-
tional burden that the condemnor must either satisfy or submit to
when it seeks to condemn property.
The first variation, exemption from a limitation imposed upon
others, is illustrated by condemnors whose authority is granted in
article 1 of chapter 40 and thereby are limited in their condemnation
by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-10 (1966), a section within the article
that forbids the condemnation of dwelling houses and burial grounds.
At the same time, condemnors who derive eminent domain authority
from a statute outside article 1 but are required to proceed according
to the procedure of chapter 40 are exempted from the limitation of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-10 (1966). They may condemn dwelling
houses or burial grounds while proceeding under the article 2 pro-
cedure.'
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40-11 to -29 (1966). The major exception to the
use of this procedure are condemnations by the State Highway Department
under article 9 of chapter 136 of the General Statutes.
' N.C. Pub. Laws 1871, ch. 138.
1" Of the nineteen sections that comprise the present article 2, all but
four were part of the 1871 law. Because of its origin, the article 2 pro-
cedure has been referred to, until recent years, as the railroad condemna-
tion procedure. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-15 (1964), which grants
cities and counties the power to acquire property for hospitals "under the
provisions of law for the condemnation of land for railroads." Such
language needs to be updated.
'In Town of Mount Olive v. Cowan, 235 N.C. 259, 69 S.E.2d 525
(1952), the court rejected the argument that the limitations of article 1
must be applied to a condemnor whose authority comes from another chap-
ter of General Statutes. The Court stated: "[I]n our opinion the limitation
[Vol. 45
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This variation of procedural burden creates an interesting situa-
tion in the case of condemnors that are given condemnation power
for the same purpose by both article 1 of chapter 40 and a statute
outside this article. For example, cities and counties have been con-
ferred eminent domain power both in chapter 40 and in another
chapter for the same purpose. (Examples are electric power sys-
tems, hospitals, and sewer and water systems for municipalities;
hospitals and schools for counties.) The power granted is for the
same purpose; the procedures are different. Since the city or county
is not subject to the article 1, chapter 40, limitations (or sub-
stantive limitations of article 2) 17 when the condemnation suit is
brought on authority outside article 1, it will most likely cite the
authority that is outside chapter 40. Quaere, what justification is
there for having in effect two different procedures for the same
condemnor condemning for the identical purpose?
Another type of difference in procedure for condemnors author-
ized to use article 2 results when the statute granting the authority
requires the condemnor first to satisfy a preliminary procedure not
required by article 2.1s Examples of such condemnors are state
agencies that must first get approval from the Department of Ad-
ministration 9 or public utilities that are required to obtain a cer-
contained in G.S. § 40-10 is a limitation only upon such corporations as are
defined and named in the preceding sections in the article [article 1], when
exercising the power of eminent domain granted in the act, or the amend-
ments thereto. .. ." Id. at 263, 69 S.E.2d at 529.
In some instances the legislature has specifically exempted a condemnor
from this prohibition. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-130 (1964), which
exempts sanitary district boards from the application of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 40-10 (1966). The statute also exempts them from N.C. GEN. STAT. §
40-19 (1966) which requires a deposit of a sum equal to the appraisal in
the event the property owner decides to take an appeal from the order of
the commissioners of appraisal.
" In Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531,
112 S.E.2d 111 (1960), the Court freed all condemnors proceeding accord-
ing to article 2 on authority granted elsewhere from any substantive limita-
tions of the article 2 procedure, in this case from the limitation of con-
demning only an easement right as had been required by N.C. CoNs. STAT.
§ 1723 (1919) and is now part of the article 2 procedure, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 40-19 (1966). Consequently, today the reference to the chapter 40 con-
demnation procedure is a reference "merely for procedural purposes." Town
of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531, 112 S.E.2d 111
(1960).
" With one exception, additional burdens are imposed by grants other
than chapter 40. The exception is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-2(10) (1966) that
authorizes corporations and bodies politic of public sewerage systems but
only after they have been granted a certificate of public convenience and
necessity by the North Carolina Utilities Commission.
"9 The condemnation is actually brought in the name of the Department
of Administration.
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tificate of public convenience and necessity from the North Carolina
Utilities Commission before they can proceed with the condemna-
tion under article 2.
Sometimes for such condemnors a limitation (such as that im-
posed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-10 (1966) regarding graveyards
and dwelling houses) and an additional procedure (such as obtaining
a certificate) may both significantly affect the condemnation. ° In
this situation, the condemnor's attorney will be forced to make a
choice between (a) avoiding some preliminary procedures called for
by a grant other than chapter 40, and (b) avoiding some limitations
imposed by chapter 40 when article 1 of chapter 40 is cited as the
authority for the condemnation.
With the exception of the two modifications noted, condemnors
authorized to acquire property under article 2 proceed in a uniform
manner. The question arises, however, why the procedural require-
ments should differ, particularly for the same condemnor when it
is condemning for the same purpose. It would appear that the legis-
lature in effect has created different procedures when it requires a
preliminary burden to be met first. The result is that different
condemnation proceedings under article 2 in some cases vary more
than some entirely separate procedures that have been authorized in
different chapters. This situation is one of many that contribute to
the confusion in the article 2 procedure.
The article 2 assessment process can be initiated by either the
condemnor or condemnee21 by filing a petition with the clerk of the
superior court for the county in which the land lies requesting that
" For example, cities and counties are authorized in both chapter 40 and
in other chapters to condemn for water systems. If the condemnor brings
the action under chapter 40, the suit begins with the filing of the con-
demnation petition. If, however, it decides to bring the action under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 162A-6(10) (1964), a statute that grants both cities and
counties the authority to condemn for water systems, it must first procure
a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the North Carolina
Department of Water Resources before it can file its petition with the clerk.
'The petitioner is most often the condemnor. However, the procedure is
available to the landowner and, when the petition is filed by him, is known
as an inverse condemnation. See, e.g., Yancey v. State Highway Comm'n,
222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256 (1942). To bring the action, the owner must
assert that there has been an eminent domain taking of his property. Usually
this type of proceeding is initiated when there is a dispute over whether a
"taking" has occurred-the landowner asserting that there has been a taking
and demanding compensation from a party who denies any taking. See,
e.g., Penn v. Coastal Corp., 231 N.C. 481, 57 S.E.2d 817 (1950). See also
Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutionad Limits of Public
Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3.
[Vol. 45
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commissioners of appraisal be appointed.2" The proceeding thus
commenced is not a typical judicial one. It is a special proceeding,
so denominated by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-11 (1966), and is, there-
fore, governed by the procedural law of special proceedings as set out
in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-393 to -408.1 (1953). Since it is a special
proceeding, the clerk of the court has original jurisdiction over the
initial appraisal process.2
The petition is a prayer for the appointment of commissioners
of appraisal, who, if appointed, must determine the amount of dam-
ages necessary to compensate the owner for his loss. In order to
establish the jurisdiction of the court, the petition must contain
certain allegations. If the landowner is the petitioner, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 40-12 (1966) requires that the petition contain the follow-
ing statements:
1. The names and places of residence of the parties (if they can
be obtained with reasonable diligence) who own or have, or claim
to own or have, estates or interests in the land;
2. If any of the parties are infants, this fact must be stated
along with the ages of the infants;
3. If any of the parties are idiots or of unsound mind, this fact
must be stated;
4. If some of the owners are unknown, this fact must be stated;
5. A description of any liens or encumbrances on the land; and
6. A description of the real estate, or interest therein, that is
subject to the proceeding.
If the petition is filed by the condemnor, it must contain in addi-
tion to those statements listed above, the following allegations:
1. A description of the real estate, to include, when an easement
is sought, a description of the easement2 4 (a map should be attached
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12 (1966). Upon presenting the petition, the
petitioner is also required to present proof of service of the petition and
of the summons to all persons whose estates or interests are to be affected
by the proceedings. This requirement is awkwardly set out in another sec-
tion, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966). These requirements on service of
the petition and summons should be transferred to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12
(1966) so that all the requirements of the condemnor's petition are together.
8 See Red Springs City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan, 250 N.C. 485, 108
S.E.2d 895 (1959).
" In City of Gastonia v. Glenn, 218 N.C. 510, 11 S.E.2d 459 (1940), the
court interpreted the requirement of N.C. Gm. STAT. § 40-12 (1966)
that the petition "contain a description of the real estate which the corpora-
tion seeks to acquire" to mean not a description of the entire track over
1967]
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if the condemnation is by a railroad) ;25
2. If the petitioner is incorporated, a statement to that effect;
3. A detailed statement of the petitioner's business;
4. A statement as to the intended use of the property;
5. A statement that the land, or interest in the land, described
in the petition is required to conduct and carry on the public business
authorized by the condemnor's charter; and
6. A statement that the petitioner has been unable to acquire
title to the land, or interest in the land, and the reason for such in-
ability.
These allegations comprise the petition. Unless it is fraudulent
on its face, the clerk will accept the petition pending an answer from
the other party.
The petition and condemnation affecting multiple landowners
and/or multiple pieces of property present a problem at this point.
While some question has existed in the past, recent cases indicate
that the petitioner may legitimately request the appraisal of several
pieces of property belonging to different owners in the same pro-
ceeding. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in North Carolina
ex rel. Myers v. Wilmington-Wrightsville Beach Causeway Co.,2"
upheld a state condemnation for the Intercoastal Waterway from
Beaufort Inlet to the Cape Fear River, an action that was brought
against multiple owners along the canal route. In a more recent
case, Redevelopment Comm'an v. Hagins,2 7 Justice Higgins, com-
menting on the single appraisal proceeding against multiple owners,
observed that: "Reason does not appear why the condemnation
proceedings covering the whole planned area may not be instituted
and all interested parties served with process and all defenses heard,
leaving only the question of just compensation due each respondent
which the right-of-way privilege or easement is to run, but a description of
the.property sought to be acquired.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-192 (1965) requires a map to be filed. The map
must mark the route and contain a profile that shows the cuts and embank-
ments.
This section was codified as part of article 9 of chapter 62, "Acquisition
and Condemnation of Property," rather than with the separate article,
article 11, on railroads. Since the other provisions concerning railroad
condemnations are in article 11, it would seem that this section should be
transferred to article 11.
*'199 N.C. 169, 154 S.E. 74 (1930).
258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962).
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to be determined in a separate inquiry."2 Nevertheless, article 2
does not specify what the court has interpreted it to mean, and some
confusion persists on this point.29 To end such confusion, it would
appear desirable to amend N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966) spe-
cifically to permit a single condemnation action against multiple
landowners or multiple tracts when they are joined to a common
plan. Thus a single action would suffice when a proposed sewer
line's route runs over several adjacent pieces of property. This
method of filing is currently provided for by FED. R. Civ. P. 71 (a).
Several North Carolina city charter condemnation procedures also
permit this type of filing."0
If the clerk finds that the petition is properly filed, he issues
the summons, and all parties whose interests might be affected by
the proceedings are served with the summons and a copy of the
petition. The summons is a special-proceeding summons that re-
quires the adverse parties to answer the petition within ten days after
service.3" If necessary, provision is made for appointment of a
guardian ad litem,a2 the appointment of an agent,m or service by
publication.
84
One required allegation of the condemnor's petition merits
additional comment. 5 It is the statement that the petitioner has
been unable to acquire title to the property sought. This condition
is in fact the raison d'etre of the procedure; article 2 is basically a
2 3Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 225, 128 S.E.2d
394-95 (1962)."9 See Ward who notes at page 2 the confusion on this point. This
paper contains an excellent summary of the article 2 procedure and recom-
mends numerous improvements in the condemnation procedure.
" In conjunction with this amendment, N.C. GEN. STAT. 40-16 (1966)
should be amended further to permit one appraisal in a proceeding against
a single tract of land that crosses county boundaries. There is little merit
in requiring two condemnation proceedings in such a situation.
rSuee N.C. Gm. STAT. § 40-13 (1966); N.C. GN. STAT. § 1-394
(Supp. 1965); and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-395 (1953). As the Court noted
in Carolina & N.W. Ry. v. Pennearden Lumber & Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 644,
44 S.E. 358 (1903), the special proceeding of condemnation begins with the
issuance of summons.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-22 (1966).
33 Ibid.
"4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-14 (1966).
" For obvious reasons, landowners are not required to make this allega-
tion. Nevertheless, the point was litigated in Hill v. Glendon & Gulf Mining
& Mfg. Co., 113 N.C. 259, 18 S.E. 171 (1893). The Court held that it
was unnecessary for a landowner to state that the petitioner and condemnor
had failed to come to an agreement of terms. See also Durham v. Rigsbee,
141 N.C. 128, 53 S.E. 531 (1906).
1967]
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procedure for parties who cannot agree36-except for condemnations
in the nature of a suit to quiet title.8
7
In recent years, however, the trend has been away from this
jurisdictional requirement, as evidenced by the several new munici-
pal charters that have specifically deleted the necessity of making
this allegation. The 1959 charter of Greensboro 8 and a 1959 emi-
nent domain amendment to the High Point charter39 are cases in
point. The omission raises the question of the requirement's desir-
ability in a general law procedure.
The reasons why these municipalities preferred to omit the re-
quirement are fairly obvious. First, the city attorneys for the two
cities, who probably drafted the charter for introduction into the
General Assembly, are the ones that must bear the burden before the
clerk of the court. Understandably they prefer to reduce the juris-
dictional requirements and to simplify the petition. Second, the
cities see the change as eliminating a useless step in those cases when
they know the landowner will not sell for what they will offer.
Third, deletion of the allegation eliminates the condemnor's burden
of proving it.
The first reason suggested for why cities are beginning to delete
the "unable-to-acquire" requirement-that it makes their jurisdiction
burden easier-undoubtedly is a result of its deletion, and the second
reason has merit; in some situations making an offer will be a futile
exercise. The third reason also is a result of the deletion, but its
significance is questionable. The problem of alleging and proving a
bona fide or good-faith attempt to purchase is not, upon examination,
the difficulty that it might appear to be. The court, in Red Springs
City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan,4 addressing itself to the problem
"°The first section of article 2, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-11 (1966), is
entitled "Proceedings when parties cannot agree." The section states that
only if the parties authorized by article 1 of chapter 40 are unable to agree
on the purchase of any real estate have they the right to acquire title by
condemnation.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held this requirement is also
incumbent upon condemnors whose authority is granted elsewhere but who
are required to use the article 2 procedure. See City of Winston-Salem v.
Ashby, 194 N.C. 388, 139 S.E. 764 (1927).
" Sometimes parties, insofar as they are known, agree on the condemna-
tion and the compensation to be paid and use this procedure in order
to clarify title. Proceedings of this nature are most often used when some
owners cannot be located.
" See N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 1137, § 6.101.
" See N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 1052. This act amended the 1931
charter of High Point.1- 250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
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of proving an attempt to purchase, held that the statement of the
owner that he would not sell was sufficient proof of the condemnor's
allegation that he has made a bona fide offer of purchase. In an
earlier decision, the court also held that an attempt to negotiate
for the property sought is unnecessary if the lands cannot legally
be acquired." In that case infants held an interest in the land and
allegation of this fact was held sufficient to satisfy this element of
the petition. There are few cases on the question, and none were
found that sustained a respondent's answer that no attempt had
been made. Thus providing proof of attempt to purchase does not
appear to be an overly difficult problem.
On the other hand, a number of reasons exist for the require-
ment, the purpose of which is to minimize condemnation suits. The
exercise of eminent domain power is an extreme measure that, being
in derogation of the common law,42 should be discouraged except
when no other method of acquiring the property remains. It is
also expensive, time consuming, and generally unpleasant for all
parties involved. A recent memorandum evaluating the eminent
domain procedure for a California county concludes that condemna-
tion without a prior attempt to negotiate has the following effects:
(1) it causes resentment and hostility on the part of the property
owner; (2) it results in bad publicity for the condemnor; and (3)
it constitutes a waste of (public) funds and manpower.
43
Most of these results occur in every condemnation; they are
compelling reasons for minimizing eminent domain suits and for
retaining any device that will serve this end. One such device that
can be suggested is that condemnors make a clearer distinction be-
tween the decision to acquire property by means other than eminent
domain and the decision to condemn that property. If it cannot
be purchased, the basic decision to acquire usually should be reviewed
with cognizance of the increased costs and burdens that are attendant
with condemnation.
Furthermore some question exists whether the requirement of
an attempt to purchase is responsible for less litigation. Few, if any,
"Western Carolina Power Co. v. Moses, 191 N.C. 744, 133 S.E. 5
(1926).' See Johnson City So. Ry. v. South & W.R.R., 148 N.C. 59, 61 S.E.
683 (1909).
'" Moore, Memorandum on the Exercise of the Power of Eminent Do-
main, Sept. 1965 (unpublished memorandum in Institute of Government
Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
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petitioners are dismissed on this basis, and in the few cases in which
the issue has been raised on appeal, the proof required of the con-
demnor has been minimal. No case was discovered that sustained
a challenge to the petition on this basis, but perhaps the fact that
the proceeding has reached an appellate state is prima facie evidence
of the parties' inability to come to terms.
After the petition has been filed with the superior court, any
person whose estates or interests may be affected by the condemna-
tion has ten days in which to file an answer. Usually, the answer
is in the form of a general denial that does not actually contest the
petitioner's right to condemn." At times, however, the answer will
deny specific facts alleged within the petition and attempt to show
why the prayer of the petition should not be granted." In such a
case a hearing must be held on the challenge.
The procedure of condemnation is a procedure in rem, or one
that is brought against the property rather than against its owner.
There are only two constitutional limitations on the exercise of
eminent domain: the taking must be for a public use, and just
compensation must be paid for the taking.46 The considerations
involved in determining just compensation are those of the valu-
ation of property; they are considered later.47 The part of the
procedure relevant to the clerk's hearing on the petition is the
"According to one commentator on the procedure, it is "customary for
answers to be filed in which all, or a part, of a petitioner's allegations are
denied even though petitioner's prayer is not really contested and although
the respondents do not plan a contest of petitioner's right to condemn." The
reason given for this denial is the fear among some attorneys that some
right of the landowner will be otherwise lost. Ward 3. The statute would
be improved by an amendment to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966) pro-
viding that if respondent does not contest petitioner's right to condemn,
filing an answer is unnecessary and instead a notice of appearance may be
filed. Federal condemnation proceedings are handled in this manner. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e).
"5 N.C. GnN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966).
"Both the state and federal constitutions limit the use of eminent
domain in this way. The due process clause of U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV
and the law of the land clause of N.C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 17 have been held
to require that private property be taken under the power of eminent do-
main only for a public purpose and only upon the payment of just compen-
sation. See Fallbrook Irrigation. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896)
(public purpose). See also West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295
U.S. 662, 671 (1935) (just compensation); and Henrick v. Graham, 245
N.C. 249, 255-56, 96 S.E.2d 129 (1957), in which Justice Parker stated that
"Eminent Domain is the power of the sovereign to take or damage private
property for a public purpose on payment of just compensation."
' See notes 85-147 infra and accompanying text.
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legality of the condemnation; it is a consideration of the consti-
tutional requirement that the condemnation be for a public purpose.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966) requires the clerk to hear the
proofs and allegations of the parties that relate to the petition and,
in the absence of sufficient cause against granting the prayer of the
petitioner, to order the appointment of three disinterested and
competent freeholders as commissioners to appraise the property
subject to the condemnation. The hearing is usually informal, and
the standard general denial of the respondent is seldom pursued.
There are times, however, when the respondent will truly contest the
allegations in the petition. In such cases the clerk must conduct a
hearing on the issue and then rule upon the challenge.4 The North
Carolina Supreme Court, in interpreting and applying this aspect
of the article 2 procedure in Abernathy v. South & W. Ry.,42 a suit
brought by a condemnee to recover damages suffered as a result of
a railroad appropriation, held that "While in other special proceed-
ings, when an issue of fact is raised upon the pleadings it is trans-
ferred to the civil docket for trial, in condemnation proceedings the
questions of law and fact are passed upon by the clerk."' The Court
then noted that if either party contemplates an appeal on the clerk's
ruling, he may formally except to the clerk's ruling and appeal the
suit to the superior court at the completion of the appraisal procedure.
The statement of the Abernathy case on the question of appeal
from the proceedings before the clerk represents a confused area of
the eminent domain law. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966) says
that "if no sufficient cause is shown against granting the prayer of
the petition" (emphasis added) the court shall appoint the com-
missioners of appraisal. The only logical interpretation to be drawn
from this language is that if "sufficient cause" is shown, the com-
missioners should not be appointed and the petition should be dis-
missed. The court, in Abernathy, speaking on the right to appeal
'In a condemnation suit neither party has a right to have this issue
tried by a jury. The clerk hears and decides the issue. Only the question of
the amount of damages is an issue for the jury. See Madison County Ry.
v. Gahagan, 161 N.C. 191, 76 S.E. 696 (1912).
150 N.C. 97, 63 S.E. 180 (1908). The Abertathy case is in line
with a number of cases forbidding appeal except on the failure of the peti-
tioner to substantiate his jurisdictional allegations. Probably the first case
so to hold was American Union Tel. Co. v. Wilmington C. & A. R.R., 83
N.C. 420 (1880). See also State v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 199 N.C. 199,
154 S.E. 72 (1930).
" Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N.C. 97, 103, 63 S.E. 180, 183
(1908).
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from the clerk's order, said: "[N]o appeal lies until the final report
of the commissioners comes in, when upon exceptions filed, the entire
record is sent to the Superior Court, where all of the exceptions are
passed upon and questions may be then presented for the first time."51
Although the court in Abernathy considered a ruling by the clerk
against the petitioner on a jurisdictional burden (in this case the
inability of the petitioner-landowner to prove ownership of the
property) to be a basis for dismissing the case, the court's language
has been interpreted by later courts as a prohibition against any
action that would result in appeal prior to the report of the com-
missioners. Thus a literal interpretation of the statement in the
Abernathy case has sometimes resulted in requiring the clerk to
proceed with the appointment of commissioners and the completion
of the process of appraisal before a party may appeal. 52
A case in point is Town of Selma v. Nobles.5 The court held
that even though the superior court clerk thought the respondent's
challenge to the petition was meritorious, he erred when he certified
it to the superior court before proceeding with the appraisal:
[N]otwithstanding the appearance of issuable matters in the
pleadings, it is the duty of the clerk, in the first instance, to pass
upon all disputed questions presented in the record, and [to]
go on to the assessment of the damages through commissioners
duly appointed, and allowing the parties, by exceptions, to raise
any questions of law or fact issuable or otherwise to be considered
on appeal from him in his award of the damages as provided
by law.
54
Id. at 103, 63 S.E. at 183.
"If the clerk, upon finding sufficient cause, dismisses the petitioner, the
General Statutes provide for an appeal to the superior court from the dis-
missal. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-272 (1953).
: 183 N.C. 322, 111 S.E. 543 (1922).
"'Id. at 325, 111 S.E. at 544. Although the court in the Selina case
held that the clerk should have completed the assessment process before per-
mitting appeal, it accepted jurisdiction and rendered an opinion on the
superior court decision. In so doing, it noted that the lower court judge
was "well within his legal discretion in directing that this vital question
should be predetermined by the jury." Id. at 327, 111 S.E. at 545. It is
submitted that the court need not have upheld the jurisdiction of the lower
court. The statute that governs, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-276 (1953) states:
Whenever a civil action or special proceeding begun before the
clerk of a superior court is for any ground whatever sent to the su-
perior court before the judge, the judge has jurisdiction; and it is
his duty, upon the request of either party to proceed to hear and
determine all matters in controversy in such action, unless it appears
to him that justice would be more cheaply and speedily administered
[Vol. 45
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According to Selma, preliminary questions are to be decided by
the clerk;" regardless of how he rules, appeal is not available to
either party until the commissioners have been appointed and their
report completed. The court then noted that the rights of the parties
"may in the meantime be protected from interference by injunction
issued by the judge." 6
Another case in line with the Selma decision is Holly Shelter
R.R. v. Newton.17 The landowner defendant had appealed a con-
demnation challenging the validity of the petitioner's charter as a
public railroad. The appeal had been taken to the superior court
judge before the appointment of commissioners and their report. The
supreme court, in remanding the case for completion of the ap-
praisal process, strongly rejected the right to interlocutory appeal
even though it conceded that the proposed use of the track appeared
untenable for a public railroad and the petition raised "a strong
doubt as to the bona fides of the charter." ' Despite these juris-
dictional deficiencies, continued the court, a question of the legitimate
business or proper use of the land condemned cannot be raised
collaterally-i.e., cannot be raised in a suit to condemn the property
-but "is an issue of fact for a jury in a direct proceeding to attack
the charter for fraud." 59
by sending the action back to be proceeded in before the clerk, in
which case he may do so.
The court could have found that not only did the clerk err in certifying
the landowner's objection as an issue to the superior court on the basis that
the appeal was premature, but also the superior court judge erred in ac-
cepting an appeal because justice would be more cheaply and speedily
administered if the clerk completed the appraisal process. Implicit in the
supreme court decision is recognition that justice is best served by com-
pleting the appraisal before the clerk, but apparently the court was unwilling
to find that the superior court judge had exceeded the bounds of his discre-
tion. That he had, however, is the only conclusion to be drawn from the
court's decision that the clerk should not have certified the issue to the
superior court.
'r See also Madison County Ry. v. Gahagan, 161 N.C. 191, 76 S.E. 696
(1912); Johnson City So. Ry. v. Southern & W.R.R., 148 N.C. 59, 61
S.E. 683 (1908).
Town of Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322, 326, 111 S.E. 543, 545 (1922).
133 N.C. 132, 45 S.E. 549 (1903).
8Id. at 135, 45 S.E. at 551.
Id. at 135, 45 S.E. at 551. The Holly Shelter Railroad Company was
indeed probably a fraud. Its charter, which had been properly granted, was
to operate a five-mile track to run from a river to a creek. The landowner
alleged that the real object of the condemnor was to operate a lumber road,
not a railroad to convey freight and passengers. Nevertheless, the court
would not consider the question of fraud and said that it could not be
maintained in a condemnation proceeding unless the charter was void and
1967l
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At least one case ruled to the contrary on the issue of the pe-
titioner establishing the jurisdictional burdens of his petition as
set forth in N.C. G-N. STAT. § 40-12 (1966). In Johnson City
So. Ry. v. South & W.R.R.0 the court held, in an attempted con-
demnation of property belonging to one railroad by another rail-
road,"' that the petition must comply with all the requirements of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12 (1966); if any of its allegations are
contested and then found by the clerk to be insufficient with the
statutory requirement, the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain is not established. In this case the clerk, despite the con-
demnee's denial of the petitioner's right to condemn its property,
appointed commissioners, who appraised the property and allowed
the condemnor to take possession of the land."2 The superior court
reversed the clerk, and this reversal was affirmed by the supreme
court, which held that the burden was upon the petitioner and that
in the absence of sufficient proof he should have been nonsuited.
From the nonsuit an appeal could have been taken."
inoperative on its face. Accord, Kinston & Carolina R.R. v. Stroud, 132
N.C. 413, 43 S.E. 913 (1903); Wellington & Powellsville R.R. v. Cashie
& Chowan R.R., 114 N.C. 690, 18 S.E. 971 (1894).'0 148 N.C. 59, 61 S.E. 683 (1908).
"The eminent domain procedure has been and continues to be greatly
influenced by the needs and demands of the railroad during its expansion
period in the late nineteenth century. As noted earlier, the article 2 pro-
cedure was enacted for the railroads and was interpreted by the courts to
satisfy railroad needs. In fact, most of the precedent for the article 2
procedure dates to the railroad expansion period, when few things received
higher priority. The railroad also enjoyed the advantage of coming into
court with a law enacted for it and with experienced and able counsel that
was usually not available to the average landowner.
It is particularly interesting that the Johnson City case was the only
North Carolina case discovered that permitted an interlocutory appeal from
the article 2 procedure, and the appeal taken was by a railroad condemnee.
'An interesting point is that an interlocutory appeal was permitted on
the clerk's granting, prior to the appointment of commissioners of appraisal,
of the condemnor motion to take immediate possession. The condemnee
railroad objected and, on appeal to the superior court, the clerk's ruling was
reversed. In the meantime, the commissioners had been appointed and the
appraised process completed. The condemnor then paid into court the sum
arrived at by the commissioners and retained possession of the condemnee's
property.
'3'In Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391
(1962), the court reversed the clerk and lower court for not requiring the
petitioner to satisfy prerequisites set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-463
(1964) before bringing a condemnation action in accordance with the article
2 eminent domain procedure of chapter 40. It would appear that the con-
siderations involved in requiring the condemnor to establish the legitimacy
of his condemnations (e.g., a properly approved redevelopment plan, a
statement of estimated cost and method of finance, approval of the redevelop-
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The apparent conflict between N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966)
and some of the case law, and between the cases themselves raises
the question of what reasons underlie the court's reluctance in
permitting an immediate appeal. An answer is found in the nature
of the condemnation suit. In these matters time is often critical, and
an appeal of "interlocutory" matters could tie a suit up for months
if not years. Under the present court system, appeals from special
proceedings to the superior court sometimes take over a year.
64
If several issues developed and were raised at different times, the
result could be a litigation of years. The court spoke to this point in
the Holly Shelter case, in which it held that the clerk should not
have permitted an interlocutory appeal. The court stated: "If
interlocutory appeals were allowable in such cases, they could be
repeated again and again, on diverse pretexts, and great delays to
the detriment of the public interest would hamper and impede and
render almost impossible the construction [planned].""
Thus to avoid delay that might render the condemnation purpose-
less by the time the land is acquired, interlocutory appeal is forbidden
until the proceeding before the clerk is completed. As some of the
cases just noted indicate, this policy has been applied even to those
situations that questioned whether the condemnor had satisfied the
statutory requirement of his petition as set out in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 40-12 (1966).
The reason for permitting immediate appeal is actually tied to or
a consequence of implementing the intent of the "sufficient cause" re-
quirement of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966), which is that if the
petitioner cannot show sufficient cause for the condemnation, he
should be nonsuited by the clerk, from which nonsuit an immediate
appeal to the superior court should be permitted. The purpose of
proceeding in this manner is to make the petitioner establish the
legitimacy of his suit before investing the time and expense required
in completing the appraisal process. This policy of a clear justifica-
tion of the condemnation is basic to the entire concept of eminent
domain, and statements to that effect permeate the North Carolina
ment plan by the governing body of the community in which the redevelop-
ment project area is located, etc.) are the same as those involved in re-
quiring the condemnor to satisfy the jurisdictional burdens set out in G.S.
§ 40-12.
" See Ward nn. 22 & 23.
" Holly Shelter R.R. v. Newton, 133 N.C. 132, 133, 45 S.E. 549, 551
(1903).
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statutory and case law. Condemnation of private property is an
act fraught with serious consequences and should be allowed only
when clearly necessary. The problem is, therefore, to establish a
policy of law that discourages easy resort to the condemnation
process yet does not delay unnecessarily a legal and proper con-
demnation. It is the problem of reconciling the needs (1) to assure
speed in the condemnation by not allowing premature appeal, and
(2) to weed out unwarranted and illegal condemnations at the
earliest point in the condemnation procedure. The problem is recon-
cilable; the cases just reviewed appear not to be.
To find a proper solution to the problem requires examining
what is at issue in a condemnation suit. Once the condemnee ac-
cepts the right of the condemnor to take his land, the sole issue in
an eminent domain case is the amount of compensation. In this
situation the objective of both parties is to arrive at a figure that
will be considered "just compensation"-the condemnor attempting
to obtain the lowest valuation possible and the condemnee the high-
est. Such factors as intended use of the property, incidental damages,
and business profits are raised by the parties in order to maximize
or minimize the final figure. Even procedural matters such as proper
notice and service of process are often raised for the purpose of
increasing or decreasing the valuation. Thus most questions, though
they may not appear to affect the amount of the appraisal, should be
viewed as part of the one issue at stake-how much should the
landowner receive for his property. On such matters neither party
should be permitted to appeal until the appraisal process is completed.
Since the right to condemn is not in issue, early appeal will only
delay the ultimate finding and can serve little beneficial purpose.
One group of challenges that the landowner-condemnee may
raise, however, should not be considered a part of the just compen-
sation issue. This type of challenge can be divided into two groups.
The first concerns the petitioner's statutory burden as set out in
N.C. GE¢N. STAT. § 40-12 (1966)-that is, it questions whether the
allegations of the petition are in order. These allegations should be
viewed as the jurisdictional burden that the petitioner must satisfy
before he can maintain his suit of condemnation. The allegations
that the condemnor is a public body that has been granted statutory
authority to condemn the described property for purposes alleged
is one example. If the defendant disputes any such allegations of the
petition, the clerk should, after a hearing, decide whether the pe-
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titioner's allegation is true. If the clerk rules against the condemnor
on such a jurisdictional issue, the petition should be dismissed.
At this point the petitioner should be permitted either to correct the
deficiency and resubmit the petition or to appeal the ruling of the
clerk to the superior court. The supreme court described this method
of handling jurisdictional issues in Johnson City So. Ry. v. South
& W.R.R."6 (an exception to most of the case law) as follows:
When these essential averments are made and denied, how shall
the court (the Clerk) proceed? It is manifest that the pleadings,
in this condition, do not raise "issues of fact," requiring the
cause to be transferred to the civil issue docket.. .. These pre-
-liminary questions are to be decided by the Clerk. If he finds
against the petitioner upon them, he dismisses the proceedings,
and, if so advised, the petitioner excepts and appeals to the Judge,
who hears and decides the appeal. If the Judge affirms the
Clerk, an appeal lies to this Court from his conclusions of law.
If the Clerk decides the preliminary questions against the de-
fendant, he notes exceptions and makes an order for the appoint-
ment of the jury to view the premises and assess the benefits
and damages. Upon the coming in of the report, if either party
so desires, he may file exceptions to the report ... and from the
judgment rendered thereon appeal to the Superior Court. The
appeal takes the entire record up for review.67
The justification for this procedure is simply that the policy of
the statute is a desirable one, and thus the language of the statute
should be interpreted to require full compliance with the burdens
it establishes. Notwithstanding the court's language in the Selma
case,6 the appraisal process should not be continued when the clerk
rules that the petitioner has failed to meet his jurisdictional burdens.
The second type of issue that refutes the condemnor's right to
condemn is that which charges that the condemnor has abused his
discretion or has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or
in bad faith. In each of these allegations the landowner is asserting
that the appraisal process of article 2 is inoperative because condem-
nation in this specific case would constitute such an abuse of authority
that the court will not permit it. When this type of charge is made,
the policy suggested above for jurisdictional issues should be fol-
lowed-i.e., if the clerk rules in favor of the condemnee, the con-
" 148 N.C. 59, 61 S.E. 683 (1908).eId. at 64, 61 S.E. at 685.6 8Town of Selma v. Nobles, 183 N.C. 322, 111 S.E. 543 (1922).
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demnation should be dismissed. From this dismissal the petitioner
can amend his petition so that the objection sustained by the clerk
is overcome, or he can appeal the clerk's decision to the superior
court. Authorization for the clerk to dismiss may require statutory
amendment in light of the case law reviewed.6 9
One might think that this policy-one that allows an appeal from
an "abuse of discretion" when the ruling is against the petitioner-
would produce a plethora of appeals before the appraisal process is
completed. An examination of the case law, however, reveals that
this type of defense is seldom upheld. When the condemnee has
challenged the route selected for a street or highway, the site
specified for a public building, or the area chosen for a state park as
an arbitrary or capricious action, the issue is basically the exercise
of discretion by the condemnor.7" The challenge is not so much a
denial of the condemnor's authority to condemn property as an
objection to the manner, time, or place that he has chosen to con-
demn the landowner's property. The clerks on the hearings and the
courts on appeal have been almost unanimous in rejecting such
71
Although objections to the condemnor's discretion are seldom
allowed by either the clerk or the court on appeal, flagrant abuse of
discretion, if proved by the landowner, has resulted in a disallowance
of the condemnation. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated
the rule and its exception in Town of Selma v. Nobles:
72
[W]here the general power to condemn exists, the right of
selection as to route, quantity, etc., is left largely to the discretion
"' If the clerk finds bad faith on the part of the condemnor, his first in-
stinct is to dismiss the procedure. However, no article 2 cases were found
that resulted in a nonsuit to the petitioner on this basis, and most of the
case law tells him to complete the appraisal process before permitting an
appeal. He is thus in something of a dilemma under the present law.
The only North Carolina case found in which an allegation of bad faith
was sustained is In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463, 70 S.E.2d 500
(1952), a condemnation under article 2. In this case the clerk had ruled
that the Housing Authority had acted in good faith and that the condemna-
tion was permissible. It was on appeal from this ruling that the allegation
of arbitrary and capricious action was sustained.
o As the court noted in In re Housing Authority, 235 N.C. 463, 468,
70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952), "'Arbitrary' and 'capricious' in many respects
are synonymous terms. When applied to discretionary acts, they ordinarily
denote abuse of discretion, though they do not signify nor necessarily imply
bad faith."
" See, e.g., Pue v. Commissioner, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896 (1942);
Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N.C. 269, 76 S.E. 267 (1912).
1 183 N.C. 322, 111 S.E. 543 (1922).
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of the company or corporation, and does not become the subject of
judicial inquiry [which includes inquiry by the clerk] except on
allegations of fact tending to show bad faith on the part of the
company or corporation or an oppressive and manifest abuse of
discretion conferred upon them by the law.73
An example of when the exception to the general policy against
early appeal should be made is the case in which the condemnor is
attempting to take property that cannot possibly qualify for the
purpose for which his authority was given.7 When the condemnee
makes this type of defense, however, he has the burden of proving
his allegation to the clerk. As the court stated in In re Housing
Authority7 5 (a case under the article 3 procedure in which the land-
owners, Livingston College, alleged abuse of discretion when the
Authority sought to take school property for a housing project),
the allegation of abuse of discretion carries the necessity of proof
by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.7" The court
then found that the condemnee had met this burden and sustained
the lower court's dismissal of the proceeding.77
Thus allegations of bad faith7" or abuse of discretion carry a
heavy burden and are sustained only in rare cases. It is this rare
"3Id. at 325, 111 S.E. at 544. See also Yadkin River Power Co. v.
Wissler, 160 N.C. 269, 76 S.E. 267 (1912); Ops. N.C. Arr'y GEN. (Nov.
30, 1959).
"' See, e.g., Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d
391 (1962).
235 N.C. 463, 470, 70 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1952).
"
8 But see Carolina & N.W. Ry. v. Pennearden Lumber & Mfg., 132
N.C. 644, 44 S.E. 358 (1903), which held that the burden of proving good
faith to construct the railroad was on the petitioner. This aspect of good
faith is different from that raised over the selection of a route and should
be viewed as part of the condemnor's original burden. As in, the Housing
Authority case, there was a substantial question of the condemnor's purpose.
" The unusual aspect of this case was that the clerk ruled in favor of
the petitioner, and the landowner was then permitted to appeal. Although
the situation appears to fall clearly within the general rule against appeals,
there is basis for an interlocutory appeal in the article 3 procedure. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-50 (1966). However, under the article 2 procedure,
this type of appeal should not be permitted. The only situation in which
an appeal on an issue of bad faith should be permitted is when the clerk
finds in favor of the defendant. Otherwise, the proceeding of appraisal
should be completed on the assumption that the suit was properly brought.
See also, In re Housing Authority, 233 N.C. 649, 65 S.E.2d 761 (1951).
"T8Bad faith has been distinguished from bad judgment and abuse of
discretion. In United States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Island, North
Carolina, 114 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.C. 1953), the federal court held
in its application of state law that an allegation of bad faith requires the
landowner to introduce facts that "suggest actual malevolence."
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case, however, that should result in dismissal; if any appeal is taken,
it should be taken from this point.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966) requires the clerk to order the
appointment of three disinterested and competent freeholders to
serve as commissioners of appraisal "if no sufficient cause is shown"
against granting this request of the petitioner. The clerk makes his
selection from residents of the county wherein the premises lie and
then sets the time and place for the first meeting. Once selected, the
commissioners subscribe to an oath that they will impartially and
fairly appraise the lands specified in the petition. At this point the
appraisal process begins.
The appointment procedure just described is not without diffi-
culties. The first problem area concerns a practice followed by some
superior court clerks of permitting "each of the parties to name one
commissioner and for the clerk to name the third commissioner.
' 79
This practice is neither legal nor desirable. Although it might be
contended that the statute stating that the clerk shall "make an order
for the appointment of three disinterested and competent free-
holders""0 to serve as appraisers does not specifically prevent the
clerk from choosing candidates recommended by the parties, there
is little evidence that this was the intent of the legislature or that a
desirable policy is served by the practice. If the legislature wanted
each party to nominate an appraiser, it would have stated so in the
statute. In several earlier legislative acts in which such a method
of appointment was desired, this procedure was specified.
The selection of appraisers by the parties involved dates back to
1777 in the condemnation procedure provided for mills.81 This
method of appointment makes the selection of "disinterested" ap-
praisers almost impossible. When each party designates a com-
missioner, an appraiser favorable to the individual's case is the one
most likely to be selected, if for no other reason than to protect the
"Ward at 13." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16 (1966).
81 Several municipal charters still provide for a similar type of selection.
See, e.g., N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 1137, § 6.103 (Greensboro), under
which the city and the condemnee each select one appraiser. The appraisers
then select a third. Another modification of this form of selection is found
in the Raleigh charter. N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 1184, § 104, provides
for the city and the property owner each to select an appraiser. If the two
cannot agree on a valuation, then they select a third appraiser who can
vote with one of the other two. Quaere, what happens if he should disagree
with both of the original appraisers on the valuation?
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party from the possibility-even likelihood--of the selection of a
partisan appraiser by the other party. The usual result in counties
where this practice has been followed is a board consisting of two
appraisers-one representing the interests of the condemnee, and
one the interests of the condemnor-while the clerk's appointee
serves as an arbitrator between the two. Thus when the clerk allows
the parties to nominate appraisers, both the desirability and legis-
lative intent of having disinterested appraisers are nullified.
This practice should be abolished where it is practiced. The
clerk should make a preliminary investigation of the persons he
thinks best qualified to serve as commissioners before he selects them.
During the selection process, consideration should be given to ap-
pointing an attorney, or someone who has had experience with the
appraisal process, as chairman of the board. An arrangement similar
to the Federal Rules provision or the article 3 procedure of chapter
40 for the appointment of a "master," an expert in condemnation
procedures, to conduct eminent domain proceedings might be the
most desirable arrangement."2 If this is not done, the clerk should
preside himself. Nothing in the statute prohibits the clerk from pre-
siding over the deliberations of the three commissioners, and if the
present appraisal system is kept, it might be desirable to require the
clerk to preside.
Two other problems exist in the selection of commissioners. The
first is that the commissioner's oath set out in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
40-17 (1966) requires them to fairly appraise the "lands" described
in the petition. This wording is unfortunate since condemnation
can be brought for many objects other than land;8 it should be
amended to read "property." Second, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-16
(1966) requires the clerk to appoint the commissioners from "free-
holders who reside in the county." The problem with this charge
is that it limits the clerk's selection in situations when single tracts
of land sought in the condemnation may cross county lines." The
restriction may also eliminate from consideration a candidate who is
better qualified to appraise the property than any person residing in
the county where the land is located. This requisite might therefore
2See FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h).
"3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-25 (1966).
", See discussion of condemning multiple tracts at note 26 supra and
accompanying text.
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be deleted and the wording of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12 (1966)
clarified specifically to permit the condemnation of any single tract
of land in the superior court of any county in which any portion
of it lies.
After the commissioners have been appointed and sworn in, they
are ready to proceed with the appraisal of the property. If the clerk
thinks it necessary, he may instruct the board as to its duties and
make any orders he deems necessary for it to "carry into effect the
object and intent of this chapter." 5 Although the statute does not
require it, the clerk should review with the commissioners the basic
condemnation concepts involved in condemnation valuation, par-
ticularly those relevant to the property they are to appraise and the
evidentiary rules that apply to the admission of testimony. This
review is particularly important if the clerk does not expect to be
present when the appraisers conduct their hearing.
These suggestions point up the major shortcoming of the article
2 procedure: there is no uniformity of procedure from county to
county in the initial appraisal process before the clerk. Because the
article does not specify how the commissioners should proceed with
their appraisal, custom and practice vary from clerk to clerk.86 The
absence of more explicit statutory direction also has meant that
clerks have done less rather than more to assist the commissioners
and to insure that only proper evidence is permitted to be introduced.
Consequently, an aura of uncertainty hangs over the proceedings at
the initial stage. Legal formalities are usually not observed, and
the result is that usually the appraisal process is conducted in an
informal manner incompatible with the judicial framework in which
it is placed." All of these shortcomings in the proceedings before
the clerk could be remedied if a uniform set of procedural rules were
adopted for the appraisal process by the commissioners. Such cor-
rective action would not only introduce order and uniformity to the
initial procedure, but also produce more equitable and respected
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-25 (1966)."6 One former city attorney reports that the basic problem with the
article 2 procedure is that it leaves too much discretion with the clerk. He
considers this to be the reason for the considerable variation of the procedure
from county to county.
87 Some clerks do not even require that the commissioners conduct
formal hearings. Consequently, parties are unable to introduce evidence they
consider relevant or cross-examine individuals offering opinions as to
value.
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appraisals that should result in less frequent appeal to the superior
court, an almost automatic step in condemnations today."
Instructed or not, the commissioners are required by statute to
view the premises described in the petition, hear the proofs and
allegations of the parties, and reduce the testimony taken to writing.
To do this they may meet as often as they think necessary, but before
each meeting both parties must be given ten days' notice. The board
also has the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths to
witnesses.89
During these proceedings the landowner carries the burden of
establishing the damages to his property." Likewise, the condemnor
carries the burden of proving any offsetting benefits when he alleges
special or general improvements to a remaining portion of the land-
owner's property."' The procedure in general must "conform as near
as may be to the ordinary practice in such courts."92 When a ma-
jority of the commissioners arrive at a figure they consider to rep-
resent just compensation, they report it to the clerk. Their report
must be made within ten days and conform in substance to the
statutory format set out in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-18 (1966).
The statute requires the report to contain assessments of both
the damages to the landowner and any offsetting special benefits
8 It is not necessary that the adoption of a uniform set of procedures
be done through new legislation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-25 (1966) gives
the clerks before whom eminent domain procedures are brought the power
to adopt such procedures. It states: "In all cases of appraisal under this
chapter where the mode or manner of conducting all or any of the pro-
ceedings to the appraisal and the proceedings consequent thereon are not
expressly provided for by the statute, the courts before whom such pro-
ceedings may be pending shall have the power to make all the necessary
orders and give the proper directions to carry into effect the object and in-
tent of this chapter ......
On the basis of this statute and its liberal interpretation by the court
in Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N.C. 97, 63 S.E. 180 (1908), the
clerks of the superior court could informally agree upon a uniform set of
procedures. It is noted that "court," according to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-7
(1953) means "clerk." Thus any action along the line suggested must be
done by them.
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-17 (1966). One clerk reports that neither the
power to issue subpoenas nor the power to administer oaths to witnesses
is used by commissioners. It is also rare that the testimony taken by the
appraisers is reduced to writing.
80 See City of Statesville v. Anderson, 245 N.C. 208, 212, 95 S.E.2d
591, 594 (1956).
' See Kirkman v. State Highway Comm'n, 257 N.C. 428, 434, 126
S.E.2d 107, 112 (1962), in which the court held that these benefits must
not be conjectural, contingent, or remote and must be proved in detail.2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-25 (1966).
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resulting from the proposed use of the property.93 These assessments
are the end product of the valuation process of the property. Unlike
other areas of law,9 4 there are no statutory criteria of value to guide
commissioners who make the appraisal nor rules of evidence as to
what type of evidence the trier of fact should be permitted to con-
sider and the weight to be given to it when he "values" the property. 5
Although the issue of admissible evidence goes to the heart of
the condemnation procedure, a complete examination of the types
of evidence that can and cannot be introduced during the appraisal
process is beyond the scope of this work. The law of eminent domain
applies to every conceivable type of property-intangibles, tangible
personalty, and realty-and multi-volume treaties deal with the
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-18 (1966) sets forth the form of the commis-
sioners' report. It provides for a setting-off of the "special benefits which
the said owner will receive from the construction" of the planned work.
"Special benefits" are benefits that accrue only to the condemnee and
not to surrounding property owners. They are distinguished from general
benefits, which are benefits common to all neighboring property owners,
and therefore are usually not deducted from the condemnation award. See
Stamey v. Town of Burnsville, 189 N.C. 39, 126 S.E. 103 (1925).
The legislature, however, can require a setting-off for both special and
general benefits. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-112 (1964) provides
that in all instances when a portion of a tract of land is condemned for high-
way purposes, the general and special benefits shall be assessed as offsets
against damages. This statute was discussed and applied in Templeton v.
State Highway Comm'n., 254 N.C. 337, 118 S.E.2d 918 (1961). See also
Elks v. Commissioners, 179 N.C. 241, 102 S.E. 414 (1920), which goes so
far as to state the general rule to be the reduction of damages by all the
benefits accruing to the landowner, whether special or general, when the
condemnation is one of a "purely public nature." Id. at 245, 102 S.E. at
416.
' In the area of taxation, for example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-295 states
that in appraising real property the county tax assessor shall "consider as
to each tract, parcel or lot separately listed at least its advantages as to lo-
cation, quality of soil, quantity and quality of timber, water power, water
privileges, mineral or quarry or other valuable deposits, fertility, adaptability
for agricultural, commercial or industrial uses, the past income therefrom,
its probable future income, the present assessed valuation, and any other
factors which may affect its value."
No such guide is given for similar valuations in eminent domain pro-
ceedings.
" It is also to be noted that neither the federal nor the state constitution
stipulates that the measure of compensation shall be the "value of the
property." The North Carolina General Statutes, in implementing the
constitutional guarantee of just compensation, have required the commis-
sioners to "appraise the lands" and to "assess the damages" but not to
"value" the property. This statutory language has generally been interpreted
to mean "value of the property," but the definition is judicial, not statutory.
See State v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 199 N.C. 199, 154 S.E. 72 (1930). See
also 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 11
(2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL].
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subject of valuation alone. However, some problems in the area of
real property deserve special consideration since real estate con-
demnation constitutes the large majority of eminent domain suits.
The valuation process employed to determine the just com-
pensation of real property can be divided into two categories-that
concerned with making an appraisal for the fee title of a single tract,
and that concerned with appraising either a fee title to part of a
formally contiguous tract or a property right less than the fee simple
title such as an easement. The law requires the commissioners to
"fairly and impartially" appraise the lands mentioned in the peti-
tion. 6 In the case of title to a single tract, this language has been
interpreted to require the commissioners to determine the "fair
market value" of the property at the time of the taking." The fair
market value is usually defined as the sum that the property would
reasonably be expected to sell for in an open market.98 To arrive at
this figure, both parties usually introduce evidence purporting to
show what a prospective buyer would be willing to pay at the time
of the condemnation. A number of rules have developed concerning
what evidence is admissible and what is not. For example, it is
generally held that the valuation should be made on the basis of the
most advantageous current use of the property.99 However, evi-
o See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-17 (1966). In the next section, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 40-18 (1966), the statute requires the commissioners to "assess the
damages."
"' See De Bruhi v. State Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 10 S.E.2d
(1958). The time of the taking has been held to be the date the petition
was filed. See Western Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N.C. 104, 136
S.E. 353 (1927).
982 MCINTOSH, NORT CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2371(5)
(2d ed. Wilson 1956) defines market value as "the price which the land
will bring on the market when offered for sale by the owner who is not
obliged to sell, and is brought by one who is under no peculiar necessity
to buy." See Gallimore v. State Highway Comm'n, 241 N.C. 350, 85
S.E.2d 393 (1954). But see discussion in 1 ORGEL § 85, in which a dis-
tinction is drawn between "actual market value" and "fair market value."
" For general discussion of the type of evidence that can be introduced
to show value of the property for a particular use, see Barnes v. State
Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E.2d 919 (1959). 4 NIc.HoLs,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3142(1), at 109 (3d ed. Sackman & Van Brunt
1950) [hereinafter cited as NIcHoLs], states the general rule that is also
followed in North Carolina:
[T]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near
future is to be considered, not as a measure of value but to the full
extent that such prospect or demand for such use affected the market
value at the time respondents were deprived of their property.
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dence that shows remote or speculative uses will not be allowed. 00
These rules, with several others, comprise the concept the courts use
as a guide to fair market value. This is not to say that the courts
apply the same rules in all cases. There are some situations when
market value is either meaningless or unobtainable-for example, in
appraising churches, college buildings, or clubhouses. In such cases
various indices such as value to the owner1 ' are used to appraise the
property. In the majority of cases, however, market value is the
measure of compensation applied.
A more difficult problem of valuation is encountered when only
a part of a larger integral tract of property (or an interest in that
property) is condemned. In these "partial-taking" cases, the for-
mula for appraisal in North Carolina is the "before and after" rule.
The condemnee is compensated for the difference in the market
value of his property as it existed before the taking and as it exists
after the taking (which of necessity allows for benefits accruing to
him from the construction of the project for which the taking is
made) ."o2 The key to the valuation is, as when the entire fee is con-
See also Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 514, 114 S.E.2d 340
(1960).
""0 See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Clark, 243 N.C. 577, 91
S.E.2d 569 (1956).
201 See discussion at note 116 infra and accompanying text.
10 Compensation for partial takings can be computed in a variety of
ways. In his treatise on valuations, Lewis Orgel lists a variety of formulas
that are used by state courts. (See 1 ORGEL §§ 48-51). Without discussing
them in detail, they are: (1) damages to the remainder included in the
value of the part taken, (2) value of the part taken plus damages to the
remainder (the majority rule), and (3) difference between the fair market
value of the property before and after the taking. (Note that these yield
essentially the same end results.) North Carolina uses the "before and
after rule," which computes compensation as the difference between the
fair market value before the taking and the fair market value after the
taking. In Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Creasman, 262 N.C. 390, 399,
137 S.E.2d 497, 504 (1964), one of the most recent cases to restate the
partial-taking rule, the court said: "Just compensation, to which the land-
owner is entitled, is the difference between the fair market value of the
property as a whole immediately before and immediately after the appropria-
tion (condemnation) of a portion thereof." Ibid.
The court has sometimes applied the majority formula: value of the part
taken plus damages to the remainder. See Stamey v. Town of Burnsville,
189 N.C. 39, 126 S.E. 103 (1925). This method of computation had not
been employed by court decisions prior to the Staney case (see, e.g., Aber-
nathy v. South & W. Ry., 150 N.C. 97, 63 S.E. 180 (1908)), nor has it been
followed in more recent cases. Although it has been suggested that the
"before and after" rule is simply another way of stating the majority rule
as in Stainey, Orgel concludes that the North Carolina method is "theo-
retically more acceptable" because it avoids the artificial dichotomy of as-
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demned, the market value of the property rights condemned. Note,
however, that the test is not the market value of the property right
or piece of property taken but the difference between the market
value of the entire property before the taking and the value of the
remainder after the taking.
In some cases this differential exceeds the value of the property
taken. For example, if a six-foot strip of land were condemned for
a telephone or telegraph line across the middle of a piece of property,
the value of that strip in the market would be practically nil; in
fact, it might carry a negative value since little can be done with it
except to pay its taxes. The value of the remaining property, how-
ever, probably would be greatly reduced with a strip cut from the
middle. The difference in market value to the property before and
after the taking of the strip would be much greater than the market
value of the condemned land. Thus the owner is being paid partly
for a loss not connected with the value of the property condemned.
This is a concept of compensation that, although keyed to market
value, is quite different from the market-value concept used to ap-
praise the loss in a complete-tract condemnation.
On the other hand, often the value of the remainder is increased
by the taking of a portion of the tract. This situation most often
occurs when strips of land are condemned for highway construction.
The benefits to the remaining property are usually far greater than
the detriments, although juries rarely reach this result.'
Before proceeding with the step-by-step description of the con-
demnation procedure, it may be productive to examine in greater
detail some of the considerations involved in the process of valua-
suming that the remainder "may be separately appraised by reference to its
market value before and after the taking." 1 ORGEL § 65. The danger of
the majority-rule approach is that juries, unable "to apportion the value of
the whole between the value of the part taken and the remainder," will often
award unjustified damages.
108 See note 98 supra.
104 For example, in the highway right-of-way condemnations for the
Chapel Hill-Durham highway, the value of the tracts partially taken actually
exceeded by several times the "before" value of these tracts. Nevertheless,
commissioners of appraisal and juries on appeal awarded substantial pay-
ments to the property owners. A recent study of the effects on adjacent
and nearby property on the construction of an interstate highway in Ten-
nessee reports that recovery rates on remainder parcels tend on the average
to be relatively high. Interchange areas, it reports, show substantial and
rapid increase in value. See Pipkin & Hendrix, Some Findings on the Impact
of Interstate Highways in Tennessee Severance Studies, Tennessee Survey
of Business, Oct. 1966.
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tion-whether it concerns real, personal or intangible property, a
single tract or only part of a tract. This process, for.most eminent
domain cases, is what the dispute is all about: How much must the
condemnor pay for the property he takes?
Although the process of valuation may appear to be basically a
simple determination of what a buyer in an open, competitive market
will pay for the property, it is a system fraught with complexities.
To understand the process one must first understand what is meant
by value. As noted earlier, the constitutions, both state and federal,
require the payment of "just compensation," which is defined as a
payment in money equal to the "value" of the property condemned.
Value in this context is a monetary representation of what society
thinks the property is worth. And any society's concept of property
value is a product of its culture. "It is culture which makes a dia-
mond valuable and a pebble worthless."'05
When legislatures and courts attempt to devise rules for the
admission and exclusion of evidence on property value, an almost
impossible hurdle is thrown up when they must adopt rules of law
that will apply equally to multiple cultures, some of which are sepa-
rated geographically and some of which coexist within the same
geographical area, but all of which come within the same jurisdic-
tion-in the present case, that of the State of North Carolina."0
Since different cultures will value most, if not all, property differ-
ently 0 7 (often this may be an insignificant variation), the problem
OI Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Professor Reich
raises a question relevant to the condemnation procedure. He asks, "What
is property?" and then argues that many intangible rights such as franchises,
social security, and licenses to do business should be considered property
rights. If they were so denominated, the power of eminent domain and
the constitutionally protected right to just compensation would be extended
to these types of property. Since other types of intangibles, such as good
will and minority-stockholder rights, have in some cases been held to be
property, it can be argued that the concept of property should be extended
to cover such intangibles as franchises and licenses.
"'While North Carolina usually does not consider itself a state with
different cultures, differences do exist-most notably between Negro and
white cultures-and these different cultures coexist in the same geographical
area. Differences also occur among the three basic regions of the state-
coastal, piedmont, and mountain-all of which have different cultures with
correspondingly different values. Within each of these geographical areas,
many subculture breakdowns exist. There are not only differences produced
by the different races but also those created by such factors as urban or
rural residence and class of society. The breakdowns are almost limitless.
107 For example, the value of sharks' teeth is much greater to a primitive
Polynesian than to the average Parisian. This type of comparison can be
made at any level at which cultural differences can be identified-e.g.,
[Vol. 45
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is to devise a single body of law that (1) will function in different
areas of the state so as to permit culturally derived differences in
judgments of value to be reflected in the condemnation awards of
similar types of property, and (2) will result in closely approximate
condemnation awards for similar types of property in the same geo-
graphical area.' This problem is compounded by the fact that
cultures and subcultures are constantly changing, and with these
changes the concept of property values changes.
Like many problems, this one has no perfect solution. Of the
two functions that the law must serve, that of adopting a system
of evidentiary rules that will enable appraisers from different cul-
tural backgrounds (appraising in the same area) to produce equal
valuations is the most difficult. The extreme situation in North
Carolina would be represented by boards of appraisal composed in
one suit of urban, professional, white commissioners and in an-
other of rural, illiterate Negro commissioners. It is doubtful that
legal guidelines can be devised that are adequate or sufficiently
flexible to accommodate to the differences posed by these two sets
of appraisers. The subjective evaluations-sometimes called the
determinations of fact-that are an integral part of all property
valuations are operating at polar extremes in this example. Recog-
nizing the problem and allowing for sufficient flexibility in the
procedure in order that the presiding judge may minimize those
subjective judgments of appraisers that tend to distort valuations
in one geographical area, while permitting such judgments to be
operative when they reflect differences of an area, is probably the
best approach to this problem.
With this recognition of the subjective and ever changing nature
of the concept of value, the question may be asked whether market
value of the property at the time of condemnation-the basic stan-
dard for real property appraisals in North Carolina-is the best
standard. Are alternative standards available that could be used
occidental and oriental, English and American, and even North Carolina
coastal plain and piedmont. Each of these comparisons reveals different
cultural values given to a particular object.
""The requirement of the condemnation law that the appraisal of land
be performed by residents of the county in which the land lies tends to
stabilize property values within the county unit. This rule reduces the likeli-
hood of culturally derived value differentials within the county, although it
emphasizes the likelihood from one county to another. For discussion of
why this rule is unreasonably restrictive because of a different type of effect,
see notes 85-95 supra and accompanying text.
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and, if so, should they be substituted for the currently used market-
value concept?
The question as to what standard of value should be used in
appraising property involves the selection of a philosophy or
approach to the valuation process. The fundamental difference be-
tween possible approaches is the type of loss that the law will recog-
nize as reimbursable. Indeed, in many respects, the question con-
cerns not so much value as what should be valued, i.e., how far
should the appraisal process be extended once it is invoked?
First, then, what are the alternative standards that could be
selected? The market-value approach to compensation is but one of
three basic methods that Anglo-American courts have considered
for computing just compensation. The other two are value to the
taker and value to the owner. The first of these, value of the prop-
erty to the taker or condemnor,10 9 can be illustrated by a situation
in which a railroad, seeking to condemn farmland in order to build
a train depot, is required to pay compensation on the value of the
property as a depot rather than as farmland. In most cases, the
adoption of this standard would make "just compensation" a wind-
fall to the landowner. It would also undermine the basic premise of
eminent domain. Instead of representing the right of government
to acquire property for a public purpose, eminent domain would, in
effect, become a right of the property owner to enrichment because
of the necessities of government. The residual effect would be dis-
astrous to effective government; governmental property acquisitions
would be confined to cases of absolute need.
However this concept has sometimes been partially recognized.
For example, payments have been made for anticipated future use
(e.g., land expected to be converted to water property) when the
use coincided with the condemnor's intended use (e.g., city reservoir
and power plant). Another example of this concept in operation
is the payment made when a special demand for the property had
been created because of the anticipated condemnation." 0 Though
10" See Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 CoLum.
L. Rv. 1 (1931).
"'The inclusion of a market increase due to a pending condemnation
in eminent domain awards is best illustrated by cases in which the taking
has been prolonged and the property has changed ownership. Most com-
munities have witnessed speculation in land value because of a rumored
highway or a street proposal. One of the best cases on this point arose
in New York where the state court permitted evidence of the inflation of
land values due to an anticipated condemnation. The property was a natural
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seldom labeled as such, compensation for these factors is in part a
payment for the value that the condemnor has created. In general,
however, the concept is little used or recognized."- In a statement
that sounds in some ways like a New Frontier aphorism, Holmes
summarized the consensus of the American judiciary toward this
approach to compensation: "The question is, what has the owner
lost? not, What has the taker gained? ' ' 1" The North Carolina
Supreme Court has followed the general rule. In Nantahala Power
& Light Co. v. Moss,"3 a proceeding to condemn waters of a stream
for a hydroelectric project, the court held: "Neither the value to the
condemnor nor his necessity can be taken into consideration when
fixing the value.""' 4 The court then observed that if this were not
the case, the owner could "hold up" the state because of the urgency
or necessity of the taker. It is to prevent this situation, the court
states, that the power of eminent domain exists; it is to "prevent the
owner who is aware of the necessity of the taker from making the
most of such necessity and from demanding the highest price such
necessity impels."' " 5 Thus value to the taker, with the exceptions
noted, seldom has been applied by either English or American courts.
The second alternative approach, compensation based on the
value to the owner, like that of value to the taker, has generally been
rejected in favor of the market-value concept. The values that would
watershed land of lakes and ponds that would in time have to be taken by
the City of New York to satisfy its increasing need for water. Recognition
of this fact, and the expectation that when the city took it the property
would command a good price, produced a turnover of property. This type
of evidence the court admitted, saying that the value had grown over the
years and should have been considered. The original decision, Matter of
Simmons, 58 Misc. Rep. 581, 109 N.Y.S. 1036 (1907), was affirmed in two
New York state appellate decisions and finally by the United States Supreme
Court in a decision by Justice Holmes under the title McGovern v. New
York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913). But see United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325
(1949), a later case in which value to the taker as a standard upon which
to appraise the condemnee's loss was clearly rejected. See generally 1
ORGEL, ch. IV, for an excellent discussion of the value-to-the-taker approach.
3 NicHoLs § 8.61, states the general rule: "The condemnor should not
be required to pay a premium added by its own activities."
11 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
112220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10 (1941).
Id. at 205, 17 S.E.2d at 14.
11"Id. at 206, 17 S.E2d at 14. The extreme case that prompted this
statement concerned a holdout in an acquisition from several landowners.
The condemnor had already acquired all the pieces of property needed except
one parcel, and the owner of this land was holding out for a value ten to
twenty times the value of his parcel as a separate entity because he now
held the key to the entire project. Specially created value of this kind
should never be compensated.
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be compensated if this approach were adopted can, for convenience,
be grouped into three general classes: (1) business losses, (2)
personal losses, and (3) neighborhood-shared value losses. The first
group would include such things as moving expenses, loss of good
will, lost profits from interruption of business, cost of securing ade-
quate new premises, and loss of favorable financing.:" 6 These losses
are usually associated with the condemnation of a business, although
some, such as moving expenses, are also losses to a homeowner. The
second group, losses of a personal nature, is typified by loss of se-
curity, emotional uprooting, and sentimental attachment. The third
group covers losses of "property" that are not individually owned
but are common to the neighborhood. Accessibility of schools and
parks is illustrative.
117
The first standard examined, value to the taker, was rejected
because it had no legal or policy basis to support it. This writer
suggests that the law requires and good social policy recommends
that the second standard, value to the owner, be considered in cer-
11" These losses, generally grouped as incidental losses, are discussed in
1 ORGEL ch. V.
11" Property rights that are held in common with other property owners
have generally been refused compensation on the basis of an unstated idea
that property rights shared with neighboring property owners are public
property rights; and what the public owns, it need not pay for. See, e.g.,
Virginia & Carolina So. R.R. v. McLean, 158 N.C. 498, 74 S.E. 461 (1912).
The result appears to be a subsidy to the condemnor, since the property
owner in most cases will have paid for the increased property value reflected
by the shared property value. For example, property in a housing develop-
ment that is close to schools and public parks would sell for more than
comparable property in a development that was not so located. Why should
the owner not be compensated for this loss? See also Cromwell, Some
Elements of Damages in Condemnation, 43 IowA L. REV. 191 (1958).
On the other side of the coin, set-offs for benefits conveyed to the re-
maining property because of the anticipated condemnor's use of the property
taken often are rewarded. In a partial taking, set-offs from the award are
usually made for benefits conferred on the landowner's remaining property
by the condemnor's activity if they are special to his property, while general
benefits or ones that result to the community as a whole are often not de-
ducted unless the legislature has provided therefor. (See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
136-112 (1964) and the discussion of it at note 93 supra.) Thus no
compensation is specifically given for property values that are shared by the
neighborhood or community as a whole, although deductions sometimes
are made. See 2 McINT sH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2372 (2d ed. Wilson 1956). See also Elks v. Commissioners of Pitt County,
179 N.C. 241, 245, 102 S.E. 414, 416-17 (1920). This case, in considering
whether a set-off should be made for the community-type benefit, recognized
a difference between condemnors: for a quasi-public condemnor (railroad or
power company) the general deduction should not be made; it should be
deducted from the award when a public body (state, city, or county) is the
condemnor. Why this distinction should be made is difficult to see.
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tain situations as the standard for computing compensation for
property condemned. Thus payment would be made for many of
the personal losses noted above.
The first consideration is what legal basis there is for using a
value-to-the-owner standard to compute just compensation. Courts,
both state and federal, have (except for the third category of prop-
erty rights held in common with other property owners) adopted
a theory that just compensation is the right to be reimbursed for
loss of property, and that such elements as good will, lost profits, and
personal attachment to the property, as personal rights, are outside
the constitutional requirement.
The distinction between property rights and personal rights in
defining just compensation dates to a 1893 opinion of Justice Brewer
in the classic case of Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States."
His statement has become the accepted rationale for eminent domain
payment:
And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property
and not the owner. Every other clause in the Fifth Amendment
is personal. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime," etc. Instead of continuing that form
of statement, and saying that no person shall be deprived of his
property without just compensation, the personal element is left
out, and the "just compensation" is to be a full equivalent of the
property taken."n
This distinction has resulted in labeling condemnation suits as
proceedings in rem, or actions that are brought for the payment or
recovery of property losses rather than personal losses. The distinc-
tion has been followed by most states, 20 including North Carolina.'2 '
As a result, personal losses, with few exceptions, are not recover-
able-are held not to be within the constitutional requirement of
just compensation.
While the Monongahela conclusion may be good constitutional
law with respect to condemnations by the federal government, it
would appear that state courts have been wrong to transpose Justice
Brewer's limited concept of just compensation to the state context
S18148 U.S. 312 (1893).
"'Id. at 326.
120 Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in An Age of Redevelopment:
Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 68 (1957).
... See, e.g., Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 225, 128
S.E.2d 391, 395 (1962).
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as the rationale on which to deny compensation for personal losses."
The Monongahela case involved a federal condemnation for river
improvements, and thus a fifth amendment concept of just compen-
sation was involved. As Chief Justice Marshall said in 1833, the
fifth amendment is a limitation of federal power alone.'23 The states,
on the other hand, are dealing with very different constitutional
law-the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
and limitations on the power that are set forth in state constitutions.
Consequently, the rationale of the Monongahela decision is not
transferable unless the constitutional limitations upon the states are
the same as that imposed by the fifth amendment upon the federal
government.
The question is whether the analysis of the fifth amendment in
the Monongahela case is a constitutional rationale transferable to
the state's requirement to pay just compensation for personal loss.
The requirement that the State of North Carolina pay just compensa-
tion is found in both the federal and state constitutions." In 1896
Justice Harlan stated that "compensation for private property taken
for public uses" by a state constitutes an essential element of the due
process clause of the federal constitution's fourteenth amendment.'25
"2 Not only is the court's concept of just compensation one that prob-
ably should not be used in defining the state's requirement of just compen-
sation, but also it needs to be re-examined to see whether it is still a valid
interpretation of the federal requirement to make compensation when pri-
vate property is condemned. The first difficulty with Brewer's view of the
fifth amendment is that it makes no mention and apparently failed to con-
sider the historical background of the payment of just compensation. His-
torically, the protection of property by requiring just compensation has been
directed at protecting personal rights from governmental power. This
emphasis on protection of a person from being disseized of his freehold is
traceable to the origin of the just-compensation concept, article 39 of the
Magna Charta, which states: "No freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned,
or disseized of his freehold. . . ." The emphasis is on losses to the individual,
the freeman; the concept of just compensation has historically been one that
protects the person, not the property itself, from unjust takings.
Second, the court's analysis breaks down when it conceives of property
in terms of its intrinsic value rather than its value to its owner. The con-
cept of property has no relevance except in its relationship to the owner.
Private property means private ownership. Viewed in this way, property
values should be defined to mean values that the property has for the owner.
Thus loss of profits during the period of relocation of a business from
property that has been condemned results from the loss of property and
is therefore a loss of the value of the property to the property owner. This
loss and others like it, it is suggested, should be compensated.
13 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
12, See note 127 infra.
12. Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
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This does not necessarily mean, however, that the fourteenth amend-
ment's requirement of compensation is the same as that required by
the fifth amendment upon the federal government. The fourteenth
amendment's requirement "nor shall any state deprive any person
of ... property, without due process of law" should be interpreted
to require payment for losses to the person occasioned by the loss of
property rather than limited to the "equivalent of the property
taken."' 26 This is a logical and more equitable interpretation of
what just compensation as part of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause means than that given by Justice Brewer to the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
It is not necessary, however, to structure a requirement for the
payment of personnel losses upon the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Although it appears that the concept of just
compensation as part of the due process clause should be more
broadly defined, the rationale of Justice Brewer in the Monongahela
case is still the basis for construing the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause as it is applied to North Carolina. The state consti-
tutional requirement, however, should clearly not be limited to
Justice Brewer's interpretation of the fifth amendment's language
"property shall not be taken without just compensation." The North
Carolina Constitution provides that ""no person ought to be ... dis-
seized of his freehold ... or in any manner deprived of his life, lib-
erty, or property, but by the law of the land."'1 7 This phrase, held to
guarantee just compensation when property is condemned, 2 s can be
construed as a protection of a person's rights (or of his losses) when
property is taken by eminent domain rather than as a protection of
his property only. Thus the constitutional guarantee of just compen-
sation in both the federal and state constitutions need not be defined
in the circumscribed manner of the Monongahela case; they can be
broadened to include the so-called "incidental damages."'" Such
12 Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
12
7 N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17 (Emphasis added).
188 Staton v. Norfolk & C. R.R., 111 N.C. 278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892).
120 The primary reason that the concept of just compensation used by the
courts today does not give much recognition to incidental damages resulting
from a condemnation is historical. At the time the concept was developed
in this country, most property taken was unclaimed and unimproved and
that involved little loss to private owners, and incidental damages, if any
existed, were insignificant. Thus little, if any, consideration of incidental
damages in computing just compensation was made. Today, however, many
condemnations involve substantial incidental losses for which no compensa-
tion is made. We are using a concept that was just in its day but in 1967
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losses can be considered as constitutionally protected by the require-
ment of just compensation in the same manner that property values
are presently protected.
The resolution of the constitutional issue in favor of compensa-
tion raises a problem of devising rules for payment. The courts have
often stated that the appraisal of incidental losses is too speculative
and remote for a jury to decide.' How, they have asked, can an
objective appraisal be made for such deprivations as loss of emo-
tional security resulting when a man's homestead is taken or loss
of good will that follows the condemnation of a business enterprise?
While this type of loss does indeed create a difficult problem of
proof, the problem is not insoluble.
Two of the three classes of incidental losses,' 3 ' property values
shared with neighboring property owners and losses of a personal
nature (e.g., security, sentimental attachment, etc.), presently are
being recouped, it is suggested, in the average condemnation award.
The currently used market-value formula, which is defined in terms
of the value of the property in the market place, usually includes
payment for a number of these incidental losses that the courts now
hold to be noncompensable. 3 2 In truth, the market-value concept
represents a balance between what the property would sell for in the
market at the time of condemnation and the value of the property
to the owner. This writer suggests that, although not acknowledged
by the courts, the elements in the landowner's property loss that are
shared by other property owners in the vicinity-such as sidewalks,
paved roads, easily accessible schools and churches-are considered
by appraisers when the market-value standard is applied, for dis-
associating these constituents of value in an appraisal is almost im-
possible. Thus the tendency of juries to overappraise (as Orgel
calls it-the jury bias for the condemnee) '3 is largely, it is sug-
needs substantial revision. For a discussion of the early use of eminent
domain powers in this county, see 1 NicHoLs 39-40.
1"' See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powel-
son, 319 U.S. 266, 285 (1942).
.. See notes 116-117 supra and accompanying text.
"' One commentator states that the method of arriving at compensation
"in the normal case . . . may correspond, with sufficient accuracy, to value
to the owner. 1 ORGEL § 15. The market-value concept cannot, he continues,
"mean the price at which the owner could have sold his property on the
day of the taking. Id. at § 36.
" 1 ORGEL § 14. Orgel later observes that one should take into account
the juries' "proverbial bias in favor of the owner." Id. § 83. See also,
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gested, payment for these two classes of incidental losses-per-
sonal losses and neighborhood-shared value losses.
The only type of loss for which no compensation is probably
made, although it may to some extent be part of the "bias bonus," is
the so-called business losses, i.e., lost profits,' good will,'85 and
favorable financing. These are the unpaid losses for which some
adjustment should-in fulfillment of constitutional law as just
interpreted-be made. The courts have said that these losses
are too speculative for a court to appraise. If by "speculative" the
court means "of uncertain quantity," or that the appraisal process
is too subjective for a jury to reach a figure, the objection can be
overruled. Juries in personal injury suits place a monetary value on
losses, such as mental anguish," 6 that are more uncertain or sub-
jective than the business losses just mentioned.8 7  Special evi-
dentiary rules or criteria may be needed for appraising, for example,
loss of favorable financing, but the development of special rules to
apply to specific types of losses is in keeping with the system of
Note, 29 HARv. L. Rrv. 427, 429 (1916). However, a North Carolina su-
perior court clerk who has presided over many condemnation appraisals
states that boards of commissioners and juries are very close in their apprais-
als, and their appraisals usually represent what he considers the property
to be worth. If this is true, the difference between what the condemnor
states the property is worth and the final appraisal may actually reflect an
underappraisal by the condemnor rather than jury bias for the owner.
"' Lost profits may result from either a partial or a total taking. In
Riverside Milling Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 190 N.C. 692, 130 S.E.
724 (1925), a mill owner lost business because of a newly erected state
bridge that directed traffic away from his mill. Part of the land condemned
for the bridge had belonged to the mill owner, who now sought incidental
damages resulting from lost patronage. This claim was rejected as being
too, uncertain and speculative for the court to measure.
The claim for lost profits that was rejected in the Riverside case should
be distinguished from those that result from a total cessation of business
resulting from a forced move to a new location. Lost profits in the partial-
taking cases are indeed a highly remote and speculative contingency. When
the business stops completely, however, the loss is much more easily mea-
sured; the appraiser is concerned with loss of all profits for a specified time,
not a reduction in some profits for an indefinite period. The past year's
reported income on income tax returns would provide a good index to
measure the loss.
2" For a model act to provide compensation for loss of good will result-
ing from eminent domain proceedings, see 3 Hv. J. LEnis. 445 (1966).
See PRossER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955).
" Some recognition of incidental losses and at least an acknowledgment
of a moral responsibility to make recompenses for them have become evi-
dent. The 1965 General Assembly enacted a law that provides for payment
of a set fee to cover moving costs for displaced occupants of buildings
condemned by the North Carolina State Highway Commission. See N.C.
GEx. STAT. § 136-19.2 (Supp. 1965). It is interesting to note that the
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evidentiary rules employed in eminent domain valuation; the very
nature of condemnation, which involves so many kinds of property,
requires a multitude of special evidentiary rules to make the required
valuations. (For example, when an appraiser assesses the market
value for loss of quiet enjoyment caused by low-flying airplanes,'
or for shares of stock of dissenting stockholders,"3 9 or for depriva-
tion of the common law right of access to a public highway, 4 ' the
valuation process is adjusted so that it adapts to the type of property
being valued.) 4 . Thus special rules for computing the values of
these incidental losses would be a natural development in the emi-
nent domain law.
These recommendations concerning compensation of incidental
damage would produce changes. Condemnation awards would be
higher as they came closer to full indemnity. This change, however,
would likely produce more negotiated settlements and fewer con-
demnations. For these improvements in the eminent domain process,
condemnors probably would have to pay larger sums per con-
demnation, but the total cost of acquiring property by condemnation
(or threat of condemnation) might be reduced, with fewer cases
appealed and more acquisitions negotiated.' 42 Compensation for
incidental losses does not mean, however, the rejection of the market-
value formula for the valuation of most losses. For valuation in the
majority of all condemnations, the market-value concept is the
best approach available to determine just compensation. When
properly applied, it avoids grossly excessive or inadequate judgments
and, in the words of one commentator, "can produce equitable re-
sults-a reasonable balance between the conflicting interests of
condemnor and condemnee-which is, after all, the end sought."'
1 43
payment is made to "occupants," which sometimes will be a lessee, or one
who owns no "property" except his leasehold.
" See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
130 See, e.g., Spencer v. Railroad, 137 N.C. 107, 49 S.E. 96 (1904).
140 See, e.g., Hendrick v. Graham, 245 N.C. 249, 96 S.E.2d 129 (1957).
141 See 20RGEL § 204, for a discussion of the different rules of valuation
in rate making and condemnation value.
142 If the end result of paying incidental damages is increased cost to
local and state governments for their condemnation, this cost should be
viewed as a necessary part of their doing business. The loss can be absorbed
with greater equity when it is distributed over the tax base of these con-
demnors than when it is placed on one person, the property owner.
"' Cromwell, Some Elements of Damage in Condemnation, 43 IowA L.
REv. 191, 230 (1958). Cromwell notes that the shortcomings of this formula
for determining value "are often merely the result of failure to relate to
the market, and of determining the value question upon the basis of con-
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The problem of the valuation process as originally set forth-
that of devising evidentiary rules that will adequately accommodate
conflicting cultural value judgments-is not subject to a completely
satisfactory solution. Different boards of commissioners and juries
will continue to value similar properties differently, and this is not
necessarily undesirable if awards for similar types of property are
relatively equal within the same area, thus if a rural community
places a higher value on farmland than does an urban community,
there seems little reason why the law should attempt to achieve equal
payments for what are otherwise identical types of property. Com-
munity attitudes make these properties unequal even though, if
brought into the same market place, they would bring identical
prices. It would appear, therefore, that just compensation, from
both a constitutional and policy standpoint, can be interpreted to
permit different awards when cultural attitudes create different
values. This conclusion, with the admission of incidental losses
into the constitutional concept of just compensation and the accept-
ance of the currently used market value as the best standard for
measuring compensation, goes a long way, it is suggested, toward
making the process of valuation an understandable and fair pro-
cedure in the condemnation of private property.
At the completion of the valuation process, a majority of the
commissioners must set a dollar figure to represent the amount of
compensation that must be paid the property owner for the property
to be taken. This figure and, if applicable, a second one to reflect
the commissioners' estimation of special benefits that the property
owner may receive from construction to be done by the condemnor,
is entered in a written report of their proceedings.' 44 This report
should follow in substance the form set out in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
40-18 (1966). The report need not be sealed,145 nor must it state
the type or value of any benefits that the commissioners found will
siderations which are better related to the part of the determination which
decides 'is this a valid taking?'" Id. at 230.
""The appraisal report should break down the appraisals made for
various items. For example, special benefits such as new sidewalks or roads
and incidental damages such as business expenses, good will, and moving
expenses-if they were awarded-should be distinguished from the ap-
praisal made for the basic property taken. If various property values are
distinguished in this manner, the court, if the commissioners' award is
appealed, can separate the issues with the appraisal made and remand only
those parts of the appraisal in which error is found. This will avoid having
the entire appraisal redone.
145 See Hanes v. North Carolina R.R., 109 N.C. 490, 13 S.E. 896 (1891).
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accrue to the property owner. 146 If the property is realty, the com-
missioners also need not describe the property,147 but they probably
should do so if the property is personalty or intangible. Once com-
pleted (and it should be completed within 10 days after the com-
missioners are appointed), the report is certified to the clerk of the
superior court wherein the property lies. In the great majority of
condemnations, the commissioners' role has ended at this point.
When the report of the commissioners of appraisal is complete
and filed with the court, either party has twenty days in which to
file exceptions to it.' 48 After the twenty-day period has lapsed, the
clerk must decide whether to appoint new appraisers, to modify, or
to affirm the report.14 9 If exceptions to the report have been filed,
the clerk must hold a hearing and give the parties an opportunity
to be heard and to present any evidence to support their contentions
that the award is too great or too small.'5 0 If a hearing is held,
notice must be given by the party moving the adoption of the report,
or if neither party so acts, then the clerk should give the notice.'5 '
After the hearing, the clerk rules on any exceptions. If he decides
that the appraisal must be redone, he either appoints new commis-
sioners and the process begins anew or he orders the original com-
missioners to reappraise the property. There is no appeal from either
of these orders. If, on the other hand, he confirms the commissioners'
report, either party may except and appeal to the superior court at
term. 1 52 Not until this point, and only if the clerk signs a judgment
14' See Wilmington & W.R.R. v. Smith, 99 N.C. 131, 5 S.E. 237 (1888).
" See Hanes v. North Carolina R.R., 109 N.C. 490, 13 S.E. 896 (1891).
l 8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966).
One commentator on the article 2 procedure expressed concern over how
the parties will know when the report has been filed. See Ward at 16.
Nothing in the statutes requires notification to the parties. Since litigants'
rights to except to the report are limited to the twenty days following the
filing of the report, the statute should be amended to require the clerk to
notify the parties and to send them a copy of the report. Although this
procedure is voluntarily followed in some counties, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19
(1966) should be amended to make this notification procedure a requirement.
14 The role of the clerk at this stage of the procedure has been com-
pared with that of a trial judge who must decide whether to set aside a
jury's verdict because it is against the weight of the evidence. See Ward
at 17.
Do See Collins v. State Highway Comm'n, 237 N.C. 277, 74 S.E.2d 709
(1953).
"' Nothing in the statute requires the clerk to give notice when neither
party chooses to move the adoption of the report. The statute should be
amended to include this requirement...2 See N.C. GnN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966). The appeal must be brought
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of confirmation,"' 3 may either party appeal. 54 If a party has properly
excepted to the clerk's rulings or confirmation of the report and then
elects to appeal, the clerk transfers the condemnation proceeding to
the civil issue docket of the superior court.'5 5 If the appeal concerns
a question of law, the judge decides it in chambers. 58 At the first
appellate level the court may confirm the award, set aside, order the
clerk to appoint new commissioners of appraisal, or amend the
award. The judge has the power "to make such orders, judgments,
and decrees, and issue such executions and other process as may
be necessary to carry into effect the final judgment rendered in such
proceedings.'
157
If the issue is one of fact on the damages assessed, either party
may appeal to the superior court for a trial de novo before a jury.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-20 (1966), added to the article 2 procedure
in 1893, entitles either party to have the amount of damages heard
within ten days after the judgment is confirmed. See also N.C. GEm. STAT.
§ 1-272 (1953).
... A certified copy of the judgment is registered with the register of
deeds in the county in which the land is situated.
15See MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2371(6)
(2d ed. Wilson 1956).
.. According to N.C. GEn. STAT. § 7A-248 (Supp. 1965) of the Judicial
Department Act of 1965:
The superior court division is the proper division, without regard
to the amount in controversy, for the trial of all actions and proceed-
ings wherein property is being taken by condemnation in exercise of
the power of eminent domain, according to the practice and procedure
provided by law for the particular action or proceeding. Nothing in
this section is in derogation of the validity of such administrative or
quasi-judicial procedures for value appraisal as may be provided for
the particular action or proceeding prior to the raising of justiciable
issues of fact or law requiring determination in the superior court.
This statute was added to clarify any question about where condemna-
tion proceedings are to be brought when the new district court system goes
into effect. The superior court will retain jurisdiction over all such suits.
Note, however, that N.C. GN. STAT. § 7A-248 (Supp. 1965) states that the"superior court division is the proper division." (Emphasis added.) A suit
could be brought "improperly" in the new district court, and legally the
district court would have jurisdiction. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-240
(Supp. 1965).
.. See State Highway Comm'n v. Mullican, 243 N.C. 68, 89 S.E.2d
738 (1955).
"" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966).
The discretionary power of the superior court to fashion its own pro-
cedural guidelines is extraordinarily large. See Abernathy v. South &
W. Ry., 150 N.C. 97, 103, 63 S.E. 180, 183 (1908), in which the court held
that it was necessary for the courts to adopt procedures in condemnation
cases because "the provisions of the statute regarding the mode of pro-
cedure and rules of practice are indefinite and obscure."
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and determined by a jury upon appeal. 58 When the suit is tried
de novo, the jury makes a completely new appraisal. The report of
the commissioners is not admissible evidence, and the court proceeds
as if they had never been appointed. When the jury makes its de-
cision on the award, the court enters judgment on the jury verdict,
and the jury-established damages represent the final judgment,1 59
unless an appeal is taken to the supreme court.
The de novo trial before the superior court is another area in
the article 2 procedure that merits re-examination. One of the major
criticisms leveled at the eminent domain procedure throughout the
country is its considerable cost in time and money. Today an
appeal from the commissioners' report, an expensive and time-con-
suming process, is practically an automatic step in any condemna-
tion involving much value. Many states do not permit appeals that
involve new determination of fact from the appraiser's valuation,
except questions involving points of law. Unless the appraisers
have exceeded their province, their findings of fact are final. Of
course, if the General Assembly were to amend the present law by
prohibiting de novo appeals, it would be necessary to make the pro-
cedure before the commissioners more formal and uniform, with a
guarantee that counsel for both condemnee and condemnor will have
an opportunity to introduce evidence and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.
According to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966), at the com-
pletion of the appraisal and filing of the report by the commissioners,
" 8 The state constitution does not guarantee a jury right in eminent
domain proceedings. See Kaperonis v. State Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C.
587, 133 S.E.2d 464 (1963). Before 1893, if parties did not demand a jury
trial before the appointment of the commissioners, they were deemed to
have waived any right to it. Once waived, the right was lost. If the parties
are not careful, the same result of losing the right to a jury trial may occur
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966). For example, in Ramsey v. South-
ern Ry., 253 N.C. 230, 116 S.E.2d 490 (1960), the court refused a jury
trial to the condemnor because he had earlier requested to withdraw a
petition for appeal. The court held that the granting of his request for
withdrawal of appeal foreclosed a second request for appeal and a jury trial.
There is also no constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in the federal
courts. The condemnation proceeding has been held not to be a common
law proceeding; thus parties to a condemnation suit have no federally
guaranteed constitutional right of a jury trial.
.. See Proctor v. State Highway Comm'n, 230 N.C. 687, 55 S.E.2d
479 (1949).
...ROKES, AN ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY VALUATION SYSTEM S UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1961).
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the condemnor may enter and take possession of the property, 6"
notwithstanding a pending appeal.' 62 If the condemnor so acts, he
must pay into the court the sum appraised by the commissioners. 6 '
The money deposited remains with the court until final judgment
is rendered in the suit. Upon final judgment, the money passes to
the property owner, and upon payment of any court costs and counsel
fees by the condemnor,' 64 title passes from the condemnee and vests
... If immediate possession would cause irreparable damage in a suit in
which the condemnee challenges the right to condemn, an injunction or
restraining order may be obtained by the landowner to prevent immediate
possession by the condemnor. See, e.g., Topping v. North Carolina State
Bd. of Educ., 249 N.C. 291, 106 S.E.2d 502 (1959).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966) states that the condemnor "may
enter, take possession of, and hold said lands, notwithstanding the pendency
of the appeal." The appeal, as referred to in this language, is an action
that may have been taken by either party. This right to an appeal is
granted by this same statute to "either party to the proceedings." Thus the
condemnor apparently would be able to pay into court the award as found
by the appraisers, take possession, and then seek a diminution in the award
by appealing to the superior court.
Although no case has been found in which an appeal has been taken in
such circumstances, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-465(2) (Supp. 1965), a statute
granting eminent domain power to urban redevelopment commissions,
acknowledges the right of the condemnor to seek a reduction in the award
after he has paid the amount of the award into the court and the court has
paid it out to the condemnee. The statute makes no mention of the con-
demnor's losing the right to immediate possession, and since the right to
immediate possession is the primary purpose for paying the money into
the court, the condemnor apparently can take possession of the condemned
property and then appeal the award.
.6 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1966).
This statute should be amended to allow possession upon payment only
after the clerk affirms, if he does so, the report of the commissioners. As the
statute stands today, the condemnor could take possession prior to the
clerk's action on the report. If this should happen and the clerk subse-
quently should order a new appraisal, the situation would be difficult.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-24 (1966) provides for the payment of counsel
fees for attorneys who are appointed by the court for unknown parties or
for parties whose residences are unknown. The clerk also has the authority
to set a reasonable fee for the cost of the respondent's attorney when he takes
a nonsuit (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-209.1 (Supp. 1965)) and in urban re-
development condemnations (N.C. GEN. STAT. 160-456(2) (10) (21) (1964)).
The urban redevelopment law is noteworthy. North Carolina was one of
the first states to enact legislation providing for the setting by the court of
reasonable counsel fees to be charged to the condemnor as part of his costs
in urban renewal projects. Although the policy behind the law is sound
(it compensates the property owner who is seeking just compensation for
his property and has incurred substantial attorney's fees), its application
has not always been fair to redevelopment commissions, some of which
have complained about some exorbitant fees awarded by clerks. Although
a schedule of fees keyed to the value of the property taken would help to
standardize attorney fees, whether to make it statutory and how to award
attorneys for more difficult cases would remain as problems. Critics of the
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in the condemnor. 6" If the condemnor had entered into possession,
and the condemnation is then appealed, the condemnee is entitled to
interest on the principal sum set by the commissioners. 6 " This rule
applies not only to quasi-public condemnors but also to condemna-
tions by state and municipal governments.16 7 The basis for the pay-
ment is the constitutionally required payment of just compensa-
tion.'6 8 Since the condemnee has been deprived of his right to use
the property and is also deprived of the use of the money during
the time between the condemnor's taking of possession and the
passing of title (condemnee holds title during this time), his prop-
erty has been taken during this period, and just compensation must
be paid. Thus he has a right to the interest on the amount of the
damage award from the date of the condemnor's possession. M° This
arrangement is unfortunate and should be changed to permit im-
mediate payment to the landowner in the manner now provided for
in highway condemnations17 0 or condemnations for urban rede-
velopment.' 7 ' The condemnee would then have immediate use of
present law have also charged that the law promotes champerty in that
lawyers are encouraged to litigate rather than settle, since they know
that their costs for additional litigation will be borne by the commission.
All of these points suggest that this is another section of the eminent
domain law that warrants further study by the legislature.
"'See Topping v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 249 N.C. 291,
106 S.E.2d 502 (1959). But compare this procedure with that of N.C.
GN. STAT. § 160-465 (Supp. 1965), which provides for the immediate
passage of title in condemnations by redevelopment commissions.
'6 But cf. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 160-465(3) (Supp. 1965).
107 Earlier case law had exempted governmental condemnors from the
payment of interest. Not even interest on a "sum certain which is overdue
and unpaid" was owed, the court said in Yancey v. State Highway Comm'n,
222 N.C. 106, 109, 22 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1942) unless a statute explicitly
required it.
Accord, State Highway Comm'n, v. Privett, 246 N.C. 501, 99 S.E.2d 61
(1957). This outdated concept was rejected in Red Springs City Bd. of
Educ. v. McMillan, 250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895 (1959). The court held
that the condemnor, a governmental agent, must pay interest on the judg-
ment. See also Note, 38 N.C.L. Rav. 89, 92 (1959).
... Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923). For
further comment, see 1 ORGEL § 5.
10. The law of interest for condemnation proceedings has been an area of
uncertainty and confusion. The North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the
uncertainty somewhat in De Bruhl v. State Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C.
671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958), by holding that interest begins to accrue from
the date of the taking and not, as some cases have held, from the date the
petition was filed. This ruling was affirmed by Red Springs City Bd. of
Educ. v. McMillan, 250 N.C. 485, 491, 108 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1959).
... See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-113 (1964).
171 See N.C. GEr. STAT. § 160-465 (Supp. 1965).
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the money-hence the condemnor would have no obligation to pay
interest on unused money.
After the appeal, the condemnor has the option not to condemn
the property. He can at this point take a voluntary nonsuit; 72 this
action will probably be permitted even if he has already taken pos-
session of the property.1'7 The parties then revert to their original
positions, the condemnor paying the court cost. If the condemnee
prevails on the issue of the right to condemn, any money paid by
the condemnor, less costs, is returned by the court to the condemnor,
who, in turn, must surrender possession of the property to the
condemnee.
CONCLUSION
The article 2 condemnation procedure just reviewed represents
the general eminent domain procedure in North Carolina. Its lack
of clarity, its ambiguity, and the necessity for a uniform appraisal
procedure before the clerks of court, are sufficient reasons for a legis-
lative revision of the basic condemnation procedure. In addition, the
confusion, duplication, and conflict created by the other condemnation
procedures authorized by the general law, plus the maze of special
procedures and powers authorized by local legislation, also make it
clear that the General Assembly urgently needs to rethink and re-
structure this entire area of the North Carolina law.
North Carolina is not the only state in which an overhaul of
eminent domain law has been in order. Other states have recognized
their deficiencies in this area and in recent years have adopted one
standard procedure, in the process repealing unused, unneeded, and
conflicting procedures. In 1964, for example, the Pennsylvania state
legislature adopted a uniform procedure that repealed all other ex-
"2N.C. GENs. STAT. § 1-209.2 (Supp. 1965) states that: "The petitioner
in all condemnation proceedings authorized by G.S. 40-2 or by any other
statute is authorized and allowed to take a voluntary nonsuit." See State
Highway Comm'n v. York Indus. Center, Inc., 263 N.C. 230, 139 S.E.2d
253 (1964), which notes that this right of the condemnor to take a nonsuit
at any time prior to the vesting of title had been judicially established long
before the 1957 enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-209.2 (Supp. 1965)
'l N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-209.2 (Supp. 1965) contains no qualification or
restrictions on the right to take a voluntary nonsuit prior to the vesting of
title in the condemnor. But see Johnson City So. Ry. v. South & W.R.R.,
148 N.C. 59, 61 S.E. 683 (1908). When nonsuit is taken, however, the
condemnor must pay the judicial costs of his action. See, e.g., State High-
way Comm'n v. York Indus. Center, Inc., 263 N.C. 230, 139 S.E.2d 253
(1964).
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tant procedures, and in general revamped the state's eminent domain
law.'14 Nebraska, 17 in 1951, and Virginia, 7 in 1961, did similarly.
In several other jurisdictions, state commissions that have under-
taken studies of the eminent domain law will present reports to their
1967 legislatures that will recommend a complete reworking of the
existing law. In Tennessee the State Legislative Council Committee,
pursuant to a joint resolution by the Tennessee General Assembly,
recently completed a report recommending both the repeal of over
sixteen procedures scattered through more than fifty different titles
and chapters of the Tennessee Code Annotated and the adoption of
one standard procedure. 7 7  The 1967 Oregon General Assembly
will also have a bill calling for the consolidation of procedures into
a standard form,17 8 and the Kentucky Legislative Research Com-
mission has recently completed a study calling for similar legislative
changes in their state.'77 North Carolina is thus not alone in its need
for new legislation. It remains, however, among a diminishing
minority of states that are not attempting to make suitable revisions.
No suggestion will be made about what type or types of procedure
North Carolina should adopt. It seems apparent, however, that
considerable thought should be given to the possibility of prescrib-
ing a single uniform condemnation procedure for all condemnations
in the state-regardless of the condemnor. This implies that much,
if not all, of the local legislation should be repealed. Room should
be left, however, for modifying the general-law procedure to allow,
for example, for "quick-take" powers to those condemnors that the
legislature thinks should have it. The general approach, however,
should be one that minimizes rather than increases differences.
What, then, are some of the possbile alternatives open to the
state if it should attempt to devise a single procedure. Looking at
what methods are being used in the various states, a comparative
study in 1958 reported that the basic eminent domain procedure for
the forty-eight states could be categorized in the following manner:
"" See PA. JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMM'N, 1964 REPORT-EMINENT
DOMAIN CODE.
17 See Fitle, Procedure Under the New Eninent Donain Act of 1951,
35 NEB. L. REV. 259 (1955).
178 See VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.1 (1964).
1 7 7TENN. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE, STUDY ON EMINENT Do-
MAIN LAWS (1966).
"I8 Ky. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, EMINENT DOMAIN PRO-
CEDURE 91 (1965).170 Id. at 97.
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five states used only commissioners to appraise the property con-
demned; twenty-three states used commissioners, with a trial de
novo before a jury (the article 2 procedure); and eighteen states
used only a jury.' This rough breakdown shows only the basic
types of procedures used. To mention a few procedures in greater
detail, North Carolina could adopt a procedure similar to the one
recently adopted in Pennsylvania. This procedure authorizes the
condemnor to take possession and title upon filing a "declaration of
taking" and posting a security bond. The condemnee may raise
"preliminary objections" within twenty days, but this is his ex-
clusive method of challenging the power to condemn, the sufficiency
of the security, or the declaration of taking. If the condemnee is
satisfied with the amount set by the condemnor in his declaration,
the proceeding is completed. If, however, either the condemnor or
the condemnee desires to have the property appraised, he may peti-
tion for the appointment of a "board of viewers," at least one of
whom must be an attorney. This board then determines what con-
stitutes "just compensation."''
Another type of procedure prevails in the District of Columbia.
Here the condemnation may be initiated by either the condemnor or
condemnee. If the two cannot reach an agreement as to the value
of the property, either party may petition the court to have the
property valued by a group of five freeholders. The five, designated
as a "jury," are selected by the court from a special list of jurors
who are knowledgeable in condemnation law. This list is kept by
the court solely for condemnation cases.'8 2
A third type of procedure is the master system. It is provided
for by the public law procedure of article 3, chapter 40, of the North
Carolina General Statutes and by FED. R. Civ. P. 71(a). The
article 3 procedure provides that the valuation be determined by a
special master appointed by the court. After a public hearing, the
master fixes the amount of damages and compensation for the con-
demnation and reports his findings to the clerk. If either party
objects to the report, the objections are heard by the clerk, who
must then rule on them and enter final judgment. An appeal may
be taken from this judgment if either party so desires.'3
18 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules that are set out following
FED. R. Civ. P. 71(a) at 28 U.S.C. 6150 (1965).
"' See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-101 (Supp. 1966).
18 See D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 16-619 to -644 (1961).
... See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40-30 to -53 (1966).
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The federal rules also provide for a master procedure, but it is
different from the article 3 procedure just described. It sets up a
commission of three persons, appointed by the court, who operate
in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 53, the federal civil rule for
masters.18
Although all three of these procedures have much to recommend
them and should be carefully considered, they will not necessarily
improve upon the type of procedure represented by article 2. The
fact that a great amount of case law has resulted from its long use
in this state is a valuable asset, and a substantial reason for keeping
it. If the legislature were to repeal most of the other procedures and
make article 2 the only procedure, it should at that time adopt a
standard set of procedural and evidentiary rules in order to standard-
ize the appraisal process before the clerks of the superior court.
In the end, however, the urgency is not so much to find answers
to the specific questions raised in this article, but simply to recognize
that North Carolina eminent domain law needs complete re-exam-
ination and revision.
"' For a background of the eminent domain procedure in the federal
courts, see Paul, Condenmnation Procedure unoder Federal Rule 71A, 43
IOWA L. REv. 231 (1958).
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APPENDIX
CONDEMNORS AUTHORIZED To CONDEMN PROPERTY UNDER






College or university (private)

































































































"Where purpose is marked "General," the power is still restricted to the legitimate
concerns of the condemnor.
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Condemnor Authority Object or Purpose
B. Local Public Condemnors














(a) and (b) Hospital facilities
§ 139-414 Watershed im-
provement
§ 153-9(57) Courthouse and jail
§ 153-284 Water and sewerage
§ 153-287 Water and sewerage
§ 160-158(3) Recreation systems
and playgrounds
§ 40-2(5) Water supply
§ 40-2(7) General









§ 153-288 Water and sewerage
facilities
§ 130-213(6) General
§ 153-300(10) Sewerage system
§ 40-2(2) Water and sewer
§ 40-2(3) Electric power
§ 130-162 Water and sewer
§ 131-15 Hospitals
§ 131-126.20
(a) & (b) Hospital facilities
§ 136-66.3(c) Roads and rights-of-
way of state
§ 160-158(3) Recreation systems
and playgrounds
§ 160-2051 Cemeteries, city
20ther condemnation powers given to the county make no mention of a procedure.
Since few counties have special procedures, the basic chapter 40 procedure will be the one
most often used.
'The power conveyed by the first three statutory citations are also granted to colleges
and universities, high schools, public schools, and school committees of public school
districts.
'This power has been granted to only ten counties.
As with the county, eminent domain power is sometimes given to municipalities
without mention of a procedure to be used. Since most of the larger municipalities have
special procedures authorized by local legislation, the municipality, when no procedure
is designated, has a choice of using the general-law procedure or its special procedure.
OThis section grants the city the power to condemn for all purposes specified in N. C.
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Condemnor Authority Object or Purpose
Sanitary district board
Urban redevelopment commission
Water and sewer authorities
Watershed improvement district"
C. State Public Condemnors
Department of Administration
Department of Archives and
History









































§ 121-8 Historic and
archaeological
property
§ 121-16 Tryon Palace
§ 40-2(6) Fish and fisheries
§ 40-2(7) General




§ 104-11 Waterway im-
provements
§ 104-13 Inland waterway
§ 10-20 Inland waterway
§ 113-34 State forests and
parks
GEN. STAT. § 160-204 (1964). To the eleven enumerated by that section, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160-205 (1964) added the city hall as an authorized purpose.
This power is granted to only ten counties.
8All condemnations of land on behalf of the state or any state agency must be made
by the Department of Administration. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-22 (1964), a 1957 law, so
states. Before 1957 many state agencies and bodies had been given the power of eminent
domain. These grants, although not usable by the agency to which it was conferred, are
still a part of the General Statutes and thus are recorded here.
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